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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-Municipalities as Parties-Waiver of Sover-
eign Immunity by a State does not Give a Federal Cause of
Action for Damages under Sections 1983 and 1988 of the Civil
Rights Act. Moor v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
Petitioners Moor and Rundle, alleging injuries stemming from the
"People's Park" disturbances of May, 1969, brought damage actions
in district court' against Alameda County, its sheriff and some of
his deputies. They alleged claims against the county under sections
1983 and 1988 of the Civil Rights Act' and pendent state claims
under California's vicarious liability statute.' Each federal and state
claim against the county was grounded on the theory that the
county was vicariously liable under state law for the acts of its
employees.4 The county contended that under the doctrine an-
nounced in Monroe v. Pape5 it was not a "person" within the mean-
ing of section 1983 and was therefore not amenable to a suit for
damages.' It further contended that absent a claim which created
an independent basis of federal jurisdiction the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims was inappropriate.7
The ninth circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint.' The Supreme Court, affirming the courts below, held that
section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act, which allows federal courts to
use state law to vindicate civil rights where federal law is unsuitable
for that purpose, does not authorize the wholesale incorporation into
1. Moor v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), aff'g in part, rev'g in part sub
nom. Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g sub nom.
Rundle v. Madigan, 331 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
2. 411 U.S. at 696.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970); 411 U.S. at 696.
4. 411 U.S. at 696.
5. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6. 411 U.S. at 697.
7. Id. The county argued that as to petitioner Moor, who was an Illinois
resident, it was not a "citizen" for diversity purposes. The district court
agreed. Id.
8. 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g sub nom. Rundle v. Madigan, 331
F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1971). For purposes of appeal only, the Moor and
Rundle cases were consolidated.
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federal law of state causes of action., Such a use would be inconsist-
ent with congressional intent to exempt municipalities from liabil-
ity in civil rights actions brought under section 1983.10 The Court
also held that in view of the unsettled question of state law and the
likelihood of jury confusion due to special defenses under California
law," the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
hear the pendent claims. 2 Finally, the Court reversed the ninth
circuit on the diversity issue. It held that Alameda County pos-
sessed a "sufficiently independent corporate character" and was,
therefore, a citizen for diversity purposes and not a mere arm or
alter ego of the state."
Section 1983 was originally passed in 1871 as section 1 of the Ku
Klux Klan Act 4 which was directed at the enforcement of the four-
teenth amendment in the South.' 5 The act provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
In 1961 the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape7 held that a munic-
9. 411 U.S. at 703.
npd
10. Id. at 710.
11. Id. at 716.
12. Exercising this power would require, in this instance, that the
county be brought in as an additional defendant since it was not directly
suable in federal court due to the Monroe holding.
13. 411 U.S. at 721.
14. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).
15. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a history of the period,
events, and legislation leading up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act,
see Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH.
L. REv. 1323 (1952). See also Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape,
and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 279-82 (1965).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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ipality was not a "person" within the meaning of this statute. This
decision was viewed as a setback by those who considered it desira-
ble to join municipalities as defendants in a federal forum.' They
had argued that despite the personal liability of municipal employ-
ees, many abuses went unremedied because the offender was
judgment-proof." The ability to join a municipality would spread
the risk of loss, insure the successful plaintiff adequate compensa-
tion, and prevent the individual defendant from suffering financial
ruin.2" Moreover, if the municipality were liable for damages it
might guard against abuses committed by its employees and might
take steps to eradicate the offensive laws, procedures, rules or con-
duct.2 The Court in Monroe recognized the need for a federal forum:
It is abundatly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford
a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens ... might be denied ....
For these reasons, commentators began to suggest ways of avoiding
the letter of Monroe's holding2" in order to permit damage suits
against a municipality under section 1983.24 Two approaches
18. Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 137 (1972); Kates, Suing Munici-
palities and Other Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 177, 178 (1970). See generally, Power, New Wealth
and New Harms-The Case for Broadened Governmental. Liability, 23
RUTGERS L. REV. 449 (1969).
19. Kates & Kouba, supra note 18, at 136-37.
20. Id. at 138-39.
21. Id. at 140-41.
22. 365 U.S. at 180.
23. Kates & Kouba, supra note 18, at 147-67; Note, Developing Gov-
ernmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §9 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201
(1971); Comment, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights
Act: Monroe v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. CoLo. L. REV. 105 (1972).
24. Wholly aside from the question of whether a municipality is suable
for damages, is the unresolved issue of whether equitable and declaratory
relief is available against a municipality in section 1983 actions. See Com-
ment, Injunctive Relief Against Municipalities Under Section 1983, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 389 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Injunctive Relief]. In a foot-
note to its opinion the Monroe court said: "In a few cases in which equita-
ble relief has been sought, a municipality has been named, along with city
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officials, as defendant where violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were alleged.
See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Holmes v.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). The question dealt with in our opinion was
not raised on those cases . . . .Since we hold that a municipal corporation
is not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary
can any longer be drawn from those cases." 365 U.S. at 191 n.50. It has
been suggested that this footnote is somewhat "enigmatic." Injunctive
Relief, supra note 24, at 392. It has been interpreted by one court as barring
equitable actions, Dean Hill Country Club v. Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321, 324
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); and by another court as
permitting equitable actions, Harkless v. Sweeney Ind. School Dist., 427
F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1970). Even without reference to the "enigmatic"
footnote 50, courts are split on the question of whether a municipality can
be sued for equitable relief. Compare Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565
(9th Cir. 1969); Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Shell-
burne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237 (D. Del. 1968) (all
holding that a municipality is not a "person" under Section 1983 for any
purpose) with Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Adams v.
Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961); Melton v. Atlanta, 324 F. Supp.
315 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Service Employees Union v. Butler, 306 F. Supp. 1080
(W.D. Pa. 1969) (limiting the Monroe holding to damages only). The latter
view would seem to have the greater support. See Turner v. Memphis, 369
U.S. 350 (1962), where the Supreme Court remanded to the district court
with directions to enter a decree granting appropriate injunctive relief in
a section 1983 case against a municipality. The Court cited Holmes v.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), with approval. Holmes was a pre-Monroe
case in which injunctive relief was permitted against a municipality. Its
citation in this post-Monroe case strengthens the position of those who feel
Monroe is no bar to equitable actions against municipalities. See also
Comment, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Mon-
roe v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 112-23 (1972). The
Supreme Court in Moor had an opportunity to clarify and dispel this
confusion but chose to avoid the problem by stating that the "question
. . . whether a municipality may be sued for equitable relief
under § 1983-simply is not presented here." 411 U.S. at 695 n.2. Mr.
Justice Douglas, however, would have dealt with the question: "There may
be overtones in Monroe v. Pape, that even suits in equity are barred. Yet
we never have so held. Certainly a residuum of power seems available in
§ 1983 to enjoin such bizarre conduct as the offering to the police of classes
in torture. . . .I would hold that the County of Alameda in this case is a
'person' within the meaning of § 1983 for a narrow group of equity actions
and that therefore the District Court did not lack jurisdiction." Id. at 723
(Douglas, J., dissenting). While the Moor case did not alter a municipal-
ity's amenability to suit for equitable relief, a recent case, Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), specifically declares that a municipality is not
a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for equitable as well as for
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-incorporation and pendent jurisdiction-were suggested, both of
which hinged upon state abolition of municipal liability.
Section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act provides, in pertinent part,
that where federal laws are not suitable for the protection of a per-
son's civil rights:
[Olr are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
the common law. . . and statutes of the State wherein the Court having
jurisdiction . ..is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause .... 11
There is no clear indication of congressional intent in the enactment
of the statute." Courts, however, have interpreted it as enlarging the
relief available under the Civil Rights Act, 7 to effectuate the broad
policies of the Act 8 and permit the use of that combination of fed-
damage actions. 412 U.S. at 507. In that case, appellants-the Cities
of Racine and Kenosha, Wisconsin-had denied renewal of appellees
liquor licenses because of alleged nude dancing at appellee's retail liquor
establishments. Id. Appellees, arguing deprivation of their fourteenth
amendment procedural due process rights because of the Cities' failure to
hold full adversary hearings prior to the denial, brought federal civil rights
actions for equitable and declaratory relief naming only the municipalities
as defendants. Id. at 508. The Supreme Court pointed out that the district
court in holding for the appellees had relied on Adams v. Park Ridge, supra
and Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1968), which followed the
Adams holding. 412 U.S. at 512 n.9. Further, the Court said that Adams
had relied upon the Court's opinion in Holmes v. Atlanta, supra, a case in
which the issue of whether a municipality is a "person" under section 1983
was not discussed. 412 U.S. at 512. The authority of Holmes, in any event,
had been "seriously weakened" by the observations made by the Court in
footnote 50 of Monroe. The Court finally declared that it was not intended
that the word "person" should have a "bifurcated application to municipal
corporations depending upon the nature of the relief sought against them,"
and that they were outside the ambit of section 1983 "for purposes of
equitable relief as well as for damages." Id. Douglas, J., dissented for the
reasons stated in Moor. Id. at 516.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
26. Note, A Municipality is a "Person " Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Where
Local Law Has Abolished Sovereign Immunity, 9 HoUSTON L. REV. 587, 591
(1972) [hereinafter cited as A Municipality is a "Person']; Note,
Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 1201, 1216 n.72 (1971).
27. Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
28. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
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eral, common, and state law best adapted to the object of the civil
rights laws."1 For example, section 1988 has been used to incorporate
state law where federal law has failed to provide for survival of a
wrongful death action,"' or damages for deprivation of a federal
right. :"
In order to apply the section three tests must be met. First, the
federal act must be deficient in furnishing a remedy for the vindica-
tion of plaintiff's civil rights." Second, there must be an adequate
state remedy available." Third, the state remedy must not be incon-
sistent with federal law.:14
It seemed to follow that where a state had a vicarious liability
statute, :  it could be incorporated into federal law to provide a rem-
edy since the Civil Rights Act does not provide for damages from a
municipality for the acts of its employees." Countering this argu-
ment was the inconsistency of such a procedure with the rule laid
down in Monroe. When faced with the question, a California federal
district court concluded that section 1988 operates only when fed-
921 (1961).
29. Lefton v. Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
30. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
921 (1961); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
31. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Sherrod v.
Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
32. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 921 (1961). See also, Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D.
Miss. 1965).
33. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 921 (1961).
34. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Pritchard v.
Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754
(N.D. Cal. 1970). See Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42
U.S.C. . 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1215-16 (1971).
35. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 815.2 (West 1966): "Injuries by employee
within scope of employment; immunity of employee. (a) A public entity
is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee
of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omis-
sion would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
against that employee or his personal representative."
36. As one commentator suggests, "there is no reason to believe that
the Georgia wrongful death statute in Brazier is somehow more suitable
for incorporation than a municipal liability statute." Kates & Kouba,
supra note 18, at 157.
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eral law is silent as to the availability of an adequate remedy.37
Thus, the use of the state vicarious liability statute would be incon-
sistent with the Monroe rule that a municipality is not a "person"
under section 1983.38
In Brown v. Caliente,39 the ninth circuit refused to allow a damage
suit against a municipality despite the abolition of municipal im-
munity.4" Apparently without considering section 1988, the court
reasoned that Monroe acted as a bar, making local laws governing
municipal immunity immaterial.' Only the District of Columbia,
in Carter v. Carlson,42 accepted the incorporation argument and
distinguished Monroe. The Carter court argued that in Monroe
municipal liability had not been recognized by local law and that
the Court misread legislative intent.4 3 It was, in the Carter court's
opinion, the intent of Congress to leave the issue of municipal liabil-
ity to the "exclusive control of the states;" 4 since Congress intended
"to defer to the immunity that existed under local common law."' 5
Thus, where governmental immunity is abolished, a section 1983
37. Wilcher v. Gain, 311 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
38. Id. at 755. See A Municipality is a "Person, " supra note 26, at 591;
Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55
MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (1971); Note, 24 VAND. L. REv. 1252 (1971).
39. 392 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 548.
41. Id. The ninth circuit has also held that Monroe bars equitable
relief. Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969). See also note 24,
supra.
42. 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972). See also Baker v. Washington,
448 F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In January, 1973, Carter v. Carlson was
reversed by the Supreme Court. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418 (1973). The Court did not reach the question of whether the District
was a "person" within the meaning of section 1983, nor did it deal with
the point of incorporation under section 1988. More significantly, it held
that the District was not a "State or territory" within the meaning of
section 1983. Id. at 432. Since it did not cross this threshold, the Court had
''no occasion to determine whether . . . the District is not a 'person' for
the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . ." Id. at 420 n.3. In addition, the
Court said, "[W]e intimate no views on the merits of respondent's claims
insofar as they are predicated on other theories of liability." Id.
43. 447 F.2d at 369.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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damage suit would not be inconsistent with either the Monroe ra-
tionale or the intent of Congress.4" The court concluded that section
1988 incorporated into the federal civil rights laws state rules of
liability when they are more effective than federal rules of liability:4"
"If local law recognizes government liability where federal common
law might not . . . the local rule shall govern. ... 4
Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction a federal court which
has jurisdiction over a federal question may have jurisdiction to
decide a related non-federal question.4" The doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction was expanded in 1966 by United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs."' Recognizing its existing approach"' as "unnecessarily
46. Id. Note, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 1252, 1255-56 (1971); A Municipality is
a "Person, " supra note 26, at 592-95.
47. 447 F.2d at 369.
48. Id.
49. J. MOORE & A. VESTAL, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 278 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE & VESTAL].
50. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See also, MOORE & VESTAL 280.
51. In Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), the Supreme Court decided
that where "two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are
alleged, one only of which presents a federal question . . . [n]ot plainly
wanting in substance, the Federal court, even though the federal ground
be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon
the non-federal ground. . . ... Id. at 246 (emphasis in original). The Hurn
Court distinguished this situation from one in which two separate and
distinct causes of action were posited, only one of which was federal in
character. In this latter instance the federal court was not free to retain
and dispose of the "non-federal cause of action." Id. Hurn was decided
prior to the unification of law and equity by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the phrase "cause of action" was "a term of serious dis-
pute." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966). See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 2. The term became a source of constant difficulty and
confused interpretation. 383 U.S. at 724. See also, Wechsler, Federal Juris-
diction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
216, 232 (1948); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1029-30 (1962).
The standards of Hurn came to be applied in a variety of ways. See Shak-
man, The New Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 262 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 222
(1966); Note, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1631 (1966). Some courts, including the
Supreme Court in Hurn, limited the exercise of pendent jurisdiction to
cases where the state claim was necessary to decide the federal claim. See,
e.g., Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951); Mas-
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grudging,"5 the Gibbs Court established tests by which a court
could judge whether it had the power to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion. Speaking for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Brennan said
that when "the federal claim [has] substance sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court . . . [and] [t]he state and
federal claims . . . derive from the common nucleus of operative
fact,'" 3 the court has power to hear both claims. But existence of the
power does not imply an obligation that it be exercised. The Gibbs54
Court reiterated prior consistent holdings55 that the exercise of pen-
dent jurisdiction is purely within the discretion of the court and not
a matter of right.56
Following the Gibbs decision it was suggested that a plaintiff who
makes a pendent state-law claim against a defendant should be
permitted, for purposes of that claim, to add defendants he could
not otherwise sue in federal court.57 Support was given this position
sachusetts Universalist Conv. v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st
Cir. 1950). Others extended jurisdiction to state-law claims only when they
arose out of all or some of the same facts as the federal claim. See, e.g.,
Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1964); Brown & Root,
Inc. v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 319 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1963). It was attitudes such
as these that the Gibbs court decried.as "unncessarily grudging." 383 U.S.
at 725.
52. 383 U.S. at 725.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 726.
55. Moynahan v. Local 280, 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963); Massachu-
setts Universalist Conv. v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1950). Wechsler, supra note 51.
56. To aid and inform that discretion, the Gibbs Court set up guide-
lines. A court, it suggested, should weigh considerations of judicial econ-
omy, convenience, and fairness to litigants, the likelihood of jury confu-
sion, the predominance of state-law issues, and questions of federal policy
in choosing whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction. 383 U.S. at 726. The
Court also suggested that where a jurisdictionally substantial federal claim
is dismissed prior to trial, the state claim should likewise be dismissed. Id.
A contrary implication, however, is found in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970). But see Note, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 310 (1970); Note, 16
WAYNE L. REV. 280 (1969) which point to the special facts in Rosado and
distinguish it from Gibbs.
57. Note, UMW v. Gibbs & Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657,
662-64 (1968).
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by decisions in the second circuit" where the court of appeals con-
cluded that the language and common sense considerations under-
lying Gibbs seemed broad enough to allow the inclusion59 and that
it would be "an unjustifiable waste of judicial. . . time-indeed, a
travesty on sound judicial administration. . . ."to allow the plain-
tiff to litigate against two defendants in federal court but to require
him to prosecute a claim involving the same facts against a third
defendant in state court.6" Other circuits have concurred in this
opinion."
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction could arguably serve as an
instrument to contravene Monroe.2 Claims against a municipal
employee and against the municipality itself for the employee's acts
are claims which would normally be tried in one proceeding and
require similar factual showings. 3 Once the claim against the em-
ployee is proved only the agency question remains to be determined
58. Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1971); Leather's Best v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971);
Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
944 (1972). See also Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons
Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153
(1973).
59. 441 F.2d at 629.
60. Id. at 630. But see, Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th
Cir. 1969), which required an independent ground of jurisdiction before
other parties could be properly joined. Id. at 954. The second circuit has
interpreted this to mean that the ninth circuit felt it lacked power to
exercise pendent jurisdiction in this type of situation, a conclusion the
second circuit rejects. 441 F.2d at 630.
61. Cf. Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971); F.C. Stiles
Constr. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970); Hatridge v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405
F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1968). Contra, Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 259 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Gautreau v. Central Gulf S.S.
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. La. 1966), both of which relied on pre-Gibbs
opinions. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 18, at 163 n.139.
62. Kates & Kouba, supra note 18, at 161-67; Note, The Municipality,
Section 1983 and Pendent Jurisdiction, 5 VALPARAISO L. REV. 110 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Pendent Jurisdiction].
63. Kates & Kouba, supra note 18, at 163.
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in the claims against the municipality. 4 Allowing the pendent claim
against the municipality to be joined with the federal claim against
the employee would promote "judicial economy, convenience and
fairness" to the parties.65 It would protect the defendant from multi-
ple law suits-in federal and state courts-and protect the plaintiff
from needless expenditures of time, energy, and money. The fact
that the municipality would be a pendent party ought not to be a
bar and, of course, the municipality would have a defense if there
had been no waiver of tort liability. However, in the three cases
where this approach was attempted it was rejected. In two of the
cases, the courts relied on the more restrictive reasoning of the pre-
Gibbs cases. The court in the third instance, citing Gibbs, rejected
the argument on discretionary grounds.67
These two theories-incorporation and pendent jurisdic-
tion-came together in Moor v. Alameda. Petitioner's attempt to
utilize section 1988 to incorporate the California vicarious liability
statute into federal law was unsuccessful. The Court noted that
section 1988 expressly limits the authority of the federal courts to
the use of only that state legislation and common law which are "not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 8
When Congress enacted section 1983 it intended to exclude all mu-
nicipalities from liability thereunder. Thus, the "laws of the United
States" disallow the use of federal law to impose civil liability on
municipalities. Incorporation of the California law imposing vicari-
ous liability on municipalities through section 1988 would subject
them to damage suits under the Civil Rights Act. Such a result
would be inconsistent with the "laws of the United States" 9 and the
64. Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 62, at 124.
65. 383 U.S. at 726; Pendent Jurisdiction 124-25.
66. Wojtas v. Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
964 (1965), a pre-Gibbs case; Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), where the court felt itself bound by the ninth circuit decision
in Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969), rejecting the extension of
pendent jurisdiction to additional pendent parties. The decision in Hymer
turned upon Hurn and Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores, Co., 115 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1940). See 407 F.2d at 138.
67. Patrum v. Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 990 (1970).
68. 411 U.S. at 710.
69. See text accompanying notes 32-48, supra.
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holding of Monroe.10 Based on this reasoning the petitioner's argu-
ment that Monroe and section 1983 were limited to municipalities
which had not surrendered their common law immunity7 were re-
jected as "untenable."7
Even though petitioners were unable to assert a federal claim
against the municipality they still had a state-law cause of action
under the California vicarious liability statute.73 Petitioners argued
that the federal district court had jurisdiction over that cause of
action under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. However, unlike
Gibbs, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in the instant case would
bring in a new defendant.74 The district court decided that it would
be inappropriate to consider this difficult issue even assuming the
existence of judicial power to hear the claim." Since the district
court would be called upon to resolve difficult questions of Califor-
nia law and since the issue would be unduly complicated for a jury,"
it acted within the Gibbs guidelines" in refusing to exercise pendent
jurisdiction." The Supreme Court concluded, "we cannot say that
the District Judge in these cases struck the balance improperly."'
70. 411 U.S. at 710.
71. Id. at 707.
72. Id.
73. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
74. 411 U.S. at 713.
75. Id. at 715. The Court recognized a conflict as to whether a court
possesses judicial power to exercise pendent jurisdiction in such circum-
stances. It alluded to cases among the various circuits and to the "substan-
tial analogues in the joinder of new parties under the well-established
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of compulsory counter-
claims under the Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. . . ." Id. at 713-15. FED. R. Civ.
P. 13, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim provides: "(a) Compulsory counter-
claims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim . ...
(h) Persons other than those made parties to the original action may be
made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with the pro-
visions of Rules 19 and 20."
76. 411 U.S. at 716.
77. 383 U.S. at 726-27. See note 56 supra.
78. 411 U.S. at 716.
79. Id. Although the Court upheld the lower courts on the question of
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The Moor Court refused an opportunity to expand the reach of the
Civil Rights Act. More importantly, however, the Court went be-
yond a mere reassertion of the Monroe rule and emphatically barred
suits in federal. courts by individuals seeking damages from munici-
palities for deprivation of their civil rights. The language of the
opinion appears to reduce the vitality of section 1988, which ap-
peared to be developing a force and vigor of its own, to what may
be little more than a choice of law vehicle. While the Court has not
narrowed the scope of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, it has, by
its emphasis on the discretionary aspect, insured that the doctrine
will continue to be clouded by regional and territorial variants. A
person deprived of his civil rights by a municipal employee and who
seeks damages from the municipality in federal court is limited to
two approaches-the pendent jurisdiction doctrine and the diversity
jurisdiction rule. On the one hand he is at the mercy of the court's
discretion 80 and, on the other, his success depends upon his fortune
in choosing a place to live.
municipal liability it did reverse on one issue, and held that the County
of Alameda was a citizen of California for diversity purposes. The County
had urged that under California law it was not a municipal corporation or
an independent political subdivision but rather an arm of the state, thus
not a "citizen" for diversity purposes. Id. at 697. However, due to the
county's capacity to sue and be sued, to sell and hold property, to contract
for the construction and repair of structures, to issue general obligations
bonds which create no liability on the part of the State, the Court, citing,
Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868), concluded that
Alameda County has a "sufficiently independent corporate character to be
treated as a citizen of California. 411 U.S. at 721.
80. In at least one circuit-the ninth-it is quite clear how the court's
discretion will be exercised. See Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1972).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection-School Dis-
trict's Failure to Teach Chinese Speaking Students the English
Language Does Not Constitute a Violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
412 U.S. 938 (1973).
Plaintiffs, Chinese speaking students, brought a class action to
compel the San Francisco Unified School District to provide all
Chinese students who did not speak English' with some instruction
in the English language. They asked that the teaching of English
be done by teachers who spoke both languages.2 The claim was that
without such instruction they were deprived both of their right to
an education and to equal educational opportunity with English
speaking students and, insofar as some instruction in English was
already being given to some of them, of equal educational opportun-
ity among themselves,3 all in violation of the equal protection clause
1. It was stipulated that there were 2,856 Chinese speaking students in
San Francisco schools who needed instruction in English. Less than half
received some instruction, about two thirds of them (633) for one hour a
day, and the remaining students for six hours per day. Lau v. Nichols, 483
F.2d 791, 793, n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 938 (1973).
2. Of the teachers giving English language instruction, only about a
third were fluent in both languages. Id. Commentators on the problems of
students whose home language is not English have often thought advisable
relief well beyond what was asked for in this case. Bilingual classes for
general instruction have been seen as a point of departure. See, e.g.,
Carter, The Way Beyond Bilingual Education, 1970 Civ. RIGHTs DIG. 9, 19;
Exelrod, Chicano Educaton: In Swann's Way?, 9 INEQUALITY IN ED. 28, 31
(1971); Montoya, Bilingual-Bicultural Educaton: Making Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Available to National Origin Minority Students, 61
GEO. L.J. 991, 995 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Montoya]. Montoya states
that "[b]ilingual education is not the teaching of English as a second
language, a program for non English-speakers which merely stresses the
learning of English. The goal in bilingual education goes beyond acquisi-
tion of English language proficiency, seeking development of well-
integrated bilingual-bicultural individuals." Id.
3. See note 1 supra. The court dismissed this particular claim with the
contention that the classificaton claimed invidious was not the result of
state action, but "the result of deficiencies created by the appellants them-
selves in failing to learn the English language." 483 F.2d at 799. The court
also quoted language from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1970) and from McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)
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of the fourteenth amendment.' The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California found against the plaintiffs on
the merits. The court held that plaintiffs were receiving the same
education on the same terms as the other students in the San Fran-
cisco Unified School District, and thus were "legally receiving all
their rights to an education and to equal educational opportuni-
ties."5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The majority opinion held that plaintiffs were not treated
differently from other students, and thus any inequality in their
education was brought about by inequalities inherent in themselves.
The court found that the schools had no duty to take affirmative
steps to redress such inequalities, since the plaintiffs' English lan-
guage deficiency was not the result of any previous state action,
such as de jure segregation.' A majority of the ninth circuit later
rejected en banc reconsideration of the case.7 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari.'
Lau v. Nichols seems to fall within a recent line of equal protec-
tion cases in the general area of social welfare. The first such case,
Dandridge v. Williams,9 involved a challenge on equal protection
grounds to a state welfare regulation' ° which allowed an increase in
the welfare grant for each additional person in the family, but only
until a grant ceiling was reached. The Supreme Court held that this
regulation did not violate the equal protection clause even though
it resulted in proportionally smaller grants to the largest families.
to the effect that a state does not have to choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem of attacking none. Id. at 799-800.
4. Relief was also claimed under section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), which prohibits exclusion from, or discrim-
ination against, anyone in programs receiving federal funds on the ground
of race or national origin. The right to an education was claimed under fifth
amendment due process, ninth amendment reserved powers, and four-
teenth amendment equal protection, as well as CAL. CONST. art. IX § 5
(provision for a system of common schools), 483 F.2d at 793.
5. Lau v. Nichols, Civil No. C-70 627 LHB at 3 (N.D. Cal., May 26,
1970).
6. 483 F.2d at 798-99.
7. Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d at 805 (9th Cir. 1973).
8. 412 U.S. 938 (1973).
9. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
10. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 88A, § 44 A. et seq. (1969) (aid to families
with dependent children).
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Such inequalities were justified by the showing of some legitimate
state interest for the regulation." Thus, "[s]tate regulation in the
social and economic field"'" was held to follow the precedent for
state regulation of business activities 3 and to receive no stricter
review by the Court than a requirement that the regulation have a
rational basis. Welfare, the Court said, does not involve a "funda-
mental right" and thus is not to receive the traditional stricter
scrutiny under which the state has a considerably heavier burden
of justification. 4 While the view that equal protection cases must
be treated as either "fundamental right" questions or fall under only
light scrutiny has been questioned by commentators who see a new
approach in recent decisions of the Court, 5 there has been no defini-
tive abandonment of the old approach by the Court itself.
Mr. Justice Marshall, in a vigorous dissent to Dandridge, empha-
sized that welfare legislation affected people's basic needs and urged
that this made the business regulation precedent inappropriate.
11. 397 U.S. at 486. The emphasis in the discussion was more on possi-
ble acceptable state interests than on actual state purposes. The Court
mentioned the contention of the state that four legitimate state interests
existed, id. at 483, and later held that the two interests the Court consid-
ered provided a sufficient foundation for the regulation. Id. at 486.
12. Id. at 484.
13. "For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or
social regulation as 'overreaching' would be far too reminiscent of an era
when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike
down state laws 'because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought.' "Id. at 484. The quote was
from Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), where the
state regulation was of business in eyeglasses and optical instruments.
14. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel).
Strict review also follows if the state has classified persons according to
"suspect" categories, such as race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
or national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See generally
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-
77, 1087-1131 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
15. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Cf. Comment, Equal Protec-
tion in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 605
(1973).
16. 397 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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He also protested that the Court appeared to allow for arbitrary
state action as long as it furthered a possible state goal. 7 Neverthe-
less, it does not appear from recent cases that social welfare legisla-
tion will be treated differently than in Dandridge."8
Education was treated similarly in Rodriguez v. San Antonio In-
dependent School System, 9 which was decided several weeks after
Lau. In Rodriguez the Supreme Court held that education was not
a fundamental right, and that the system of financing education
through local property taxes was not unconstitutonal. 0 The case
came to the Court after a number of other lower court cases had held
unconstitutional various systems of school financing which were
based in part on the wealth of a district.2' In Rodriguez, Mr. Justice
17. Id. at 508.
18. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (lower welfare assis-
tance grants to some categories of recipients); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78 (1971) (reduction of social security benefits). Cf. Lindsey v. Nor-
met, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), where various limitations on tenants in eviction
actions by landlords were upheld, but one, a double security bond require-
ment, was struck down as a violation of equal protection.
19. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This case came down shortly before the ninth
circuit's decision denying a rehearing en banc in Lau, see note 7, supra.
The opinion dissenting from the denial of the rehearing cited Rodriguez as
authority, 483 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1973), as did the opinion concurring with
the denial of the rehearing, Id.
20. Rodriguez also held that because of the facts presented wealth was
not a suspect classification under the equal protection clause. It was diffi-
cult to identify who belonged to the disadvantaged class and also there was
no absolute denial of education to anyone on the basis of wealth. 411 U.S.
at 18-25. The Court distinguished indigent defendant cases that seemed
to hold wealth to be a suspect classification on the ground that in
Rodriguez there was no absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. Id. at
20-21. See in this context the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 22 (1956): "Of course a State need not
equalize economic conditions," but a state cannot "bolt the door to equal
justice." Id. at 23-24. For the somewhat different use of Griffin by the Lau
plaintiffs, see notes 46-54 infra, and accompanying text.
21. The pioneer case was Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), which held that education was a fundamental
right for equal protection purposes. Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 615. Because of its importance to modern society, the court saw
education as comparable to the vote and to the rights of criminal defen-
dants, two areas where the Supreme Court had found wealth discrimina-
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Powell, in a long and carefully written opinion reversed one such
decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Texas school fi-
nancing system. The decision is clearly important to all applications
of equal protection in the area of education.
Rodriguez considered and admitted the importance of educaton,
even quoting with approval the ubiquitous paragraph from Brown
v. Board of Education22 which questioned the ability of a child to
succeed in modem life if denied the opportunity of an education.
Nevertheless, Justice Powell stated, this did not make education a
fundamental right for equal protection purposes because only those
rights found in the Constitution are fundamental in this context.
The Court does not determine which rights are fundamental: "the
Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional
right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitu-
tion itself demands." 3 Thus, the welfare grant with which to pur-
chase the necessities of life may be fundamental to the person seek-
ing it, but this is not equivalent to a fundamental right which,
explicitly or implicitly, is guaranteed by the Constitution. Educa-
tion, like welfare in Dandridge, did not qualify.24
Rodriguez did not foreclose the possibility of stricter scrutiny of
equal protection claims having to do with education. While the
Court rejected the claim of the Rodriguez plaintiffs that education
is essential to the exercise of first amendment freedoms and the
vote, Justice Powell did suggest that "[e]ven if it were conceded
tion unconstitutional. Id. at 607-08, 487 P.2d at 1257-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
617-18.
22. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), quoted in 411 U.S. at 29-30.
23. 411 U.S. at 31. Mr. Justice Powell was quoting Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) which had held interstate travel to be a
fundamental right.
24. Housing does not qualify, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74
(1972). Certainly there is no mention of education, welfare, or housing in
the Constitution. Whether they are any less implicit there than the right
to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or the right
of procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), or the right of privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is, of course, debatable. A pre-
liminary distinction appears to be that those rights which have been found
implicit in the Constitution involved protection from state interference
with the person of the individual.
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that some identifiable quantum of education" 5 were constitution-
ally protected as a prerequisite to the exercise of those rights, the
facts of Rodriguez did not indicate that the education offered in the
poorer districts of Texas fell short. He then stated:
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its chil-
dren, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with funda-
mental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved
and where-as is true in the present case-no charge fairly could be made
that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and
of full participation in the political process.2"
The opinion emphasized that the claim in the case was not that
education was totally taken away from the plaintiffs by the laws of
Texas, but merely that it was being extended with greater benefit
to some than to others.27 These statements, dicta though they be,
could provide the Lau plaintiffs with a legal theory based on a total
deprivation of the minimum quantum of education that may be
constitutionally protected."
Lau was not the first case in which the relief requested was an
addition to a curriculum to fit the needs of a particular group of
students. Prior cases have granted affirmative relief to compensate
for the effects of a previous segregated and inferior education. In
Hobson v. Hansen"5 the District Court for the District of Columbia
ordered compensatory education for black pupils in the public
schools of Washington, D.C., stating:
Where because of the density of residential segregation or for other reasons
children in certain areas, particularly the slums, are denied the benefits of
an integrated education, the court will require that the plan include compen-
satory education sufficient at least to overcome the detriment of segregation
25. 411 U.S. at 36.
26. Id. at 37.
27. Id. at 23-24. There is an interesting reference in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), to the idea that "a State. . . . could not
. . . reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from
its schools." Id. at 633 (emphasis added). This was cited in Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 604-05, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
28. See notes 64-68 infra, and accompanying text.
29. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), on motion for further relief, Hobson v.
Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
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and thus provide, as nearly as possible, equal educational opportunity to all
schoolchildren 30
It might be noted that although the poor black pupils in the District
of Columbia did not come from homes where a foreign language was
spoken, the district court found that they tended to be handicapped
in the use of standard English.3 ' Hobson has been noted as possible
precedent by commentators concerned with the language problems
faced by non-English speaking students.2
A case dealing with this matter has appeared in Texas, where the
English language problem of Mexican Americans is acute.3 3 In
United States v. Texas34 the court ordered compensatory bilingual
English instruction. 5 The Lau court distinguished Texas, however,
30. 269 F. Supp. at 515.
31. Id. at 471. Two excerpts from Hobson and Lau show widely diver-
gent viewpoints: "It is true that the schools alone cannot compensate for
all the handicaps that are characteristic of the disadvantaged child; but
it is the schools that must-as defendants admit-lead the attack on the
verbal handicaps which are the major barrier to academic achievement."
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. at 473. "Every student brings to the
starting line of his educational career different advantages and disadvan-
tages caused in part by social, economic and cultural background, created
and continued completely apart from any contribution by the school sys-
tem. That some of these may be impediments which can be overcome does
not amount to a 'denial' by the Board of educational opportunities within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment should the Board fail to give
them special attention. . . ." 483 F.2d at 797.
32. "In Hobson v. Hansen . . . the education provided must be an
education adapted to the special needs of the students." Montoya, supra
note 2, at 1001. See also Exelrod, Chicano Education: In Swann's Way?, 9
INEQUALITY IN ED. 21, 38 (1973); and, on compensatory education for disad-
vantaged children in general, Note, Equality of Educational Opportunity:
Are "Compensatory Programs" Constitutionally Required?, 42 S. CAL. L.
REV. 146, 154 (1969).
33. Of the Mexican Americans in Texas, 80 percent do not complete
high school and it has been estimated that 40 percent of the Mexican
American population is illiterate. Montoya, supra note 2, at 993.
34. 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972).
See also the related case, United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.
Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016
(1972).
35. 342 F. Supp. at 30-33. The relief ordered also included bilingual
classes for general instruction and training in Spanish for Anglo students,
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as having been premised on the past state action responsible at least
in part for the plight of the Mexican American students."
Two recent district court cases have reached contrary results in
dealing with claims brought by students whose home language was
not English. Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools37 was brought by
Spanish surnamed pupils at the one elementary school in Portales,
New Mexico, which had a predominantly Spanish surnamed stu-
dent body.3" The plaintiffs claimed that the school did not take into
in a general effort that neither be "presented as a more valued language
. ." Id. at 30. It should be noted that the relief asked for in Lau was more
limited. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
36. 483 F.2d at 797. But see the material on the history of anti-Chinese
discrimination in California, including its schools, cited in the Brief for the
Harvard Center for Law and Education as Amicus Curiae, at 28-30, Lau
v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1973). Lau did cite without comment
Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971)
(on application for a stay), which stated that there had been de jure segre-
gation of the San Francisco school population for many years. (The stay
of a desegregation order in Guey Heung Lee was sought by Chinese par-
ties.) Some of the supporting material cited by the majority in distinguish-
ing the Lau case from United States v. Texas was the testimony in the
latter case by an educational expert that Mexican American students,
because of "English language deficiencies" and "cultural incompatibil-
ities" were given discriminatory treatment by the schools. 483 F.2d at 797.
In Lau, material was introduced by plaintiffs which had been prepared by
the defendant school district, stating that "[wihen these Chinese
speaking youngsters are placed in grade levels according to their age and
are expected to compete with their English speaking peers, they are frus-
trated by their inability to understand the regular work. . . . For these
children, the lack of English means poor performance in school. The sec-
ondary student is almost inevitably doomed to become another unemploy-
able in the ghetto." Id. at 801 (Hill, J. dissenting), quoting SAN FRANCISCO
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT PILOT PROGRAM: CHINESE BILINGUAL (May 5,
1969). There clearly is a distinction between English language deficiency
causing discriminatory treatment by the school, and English language
deficiency which the school has no duty to remedy and Which causes the
student to perform poorly and drop out of school. It may be questioned
whether the distinction is not a tenuous one in practice.
37. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). See also the final judgment,
Serna v. Portales Munic. Schools, Civil No. 8994 (D.N.M., filed July 31,
1973).
38. The court found that the achievement of pupils at this school was
consistently lower than that of pupils at the other elementary schools with
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account the special needs of students from an environment where
Spanish was the spoken language. They did not claim that their
school programs were inferior, or different in any way from those of
the other schools in Portales. Instead "it is the similarity of these
programs which is the crux of plaintiff's claim of inequality of edu-
cational opportunity.""9 This claim was accepted and relief includ-
ing specified minimum sessions of bilingual teaching was ordered.,
A second district court, however, rejected Serna as based on no
authority."
Since the ninth circuit in deciding Lau v. Nichols firmly distin-
guished United States v. Texas as based on previous state action,
it saw no precedent for the relief it was being asked to give. More-
over, it was thought that plaintiffs were asking for a radical exten-
sion of the concept of equal protection, the consequences of which
could not be foreseen.4" This concern appears, for example, in the
majority's discussion of Brown v. Board of Education:
According to appellants, Brown requires schools to provide "equal" op-
portunities to all, and equality is to be measured not only by what the school
offers the child, but by the potential which the child brings to the school
similar programs. This is a common thread among the cases. See notes 31
and 36 supra, and accompanying text.
39. 351 F. Supp. at 1281. The Lau plaintiffs would prevail under such
a theory. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
40. Serna v. Portales Munic. Schools, Civil No. 8994 at 2 (D.N.M.,
filed July 31, 1973).
41. Morales v. Shannon, 41 U.S.L.W. 2452 (W.D. Texas, Feb. 13,
1973). On the question of authority, Serna seized on some language from
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified and
remanded, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973), where the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit had pointed out that a curriculum not tailored to the needs of the
children would remain a problem even after integration. 445 F.2d at 1004.
To the Serna court, this was an indication that not tailoring the curriculum
to the needs of minority children was a deprivation of equal protection. 351
F. Supp. at 1282-83.
42. One suggestion to limit the extension of the equal protection clause
that would result from a holding that the state cannot ignore inequalities
among persons and satisfy the equal protection clause would be as follows:
the state could ignore those handicaps that are imposed by nature, and
have a duty to regard only inequalities "resulting from societal arrange-
ments,"since the latter are more clearly an area of society's responsibility.
Developments, supra note 14, at 1189.
NOTES
. . . .Appellants' reading of Brown is extreme, and one which we cannot
accept."
The extension of the equal protection clause sought by the plain-
tiffs can be stated as follows: equal treatment of those who are
unequal can constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. The
possibility of such an extension had been foreseen by commenta-
tors.44 It is suggested that among public school pupils, the student
who does not understand the English language presents a particu-
larly strong case for requiring more than equal treatment to fulfill
the requirements of the equal protection clause.4"
43. 483 F.2d at 794.
44. The context is usually compensatory education for disadvantaged
children. Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1147,
1168-70 (1966); Comment, Equality of Educational Opportunity: Are
"Compensatory Programs" Constitutionally Required?, 42 S. CAL. L. REV.
146 (1966); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51
TEXAS L. REV. 411, 475 (1973) (generally opposed to mandating such pro-
grams, but distinguishes cases such as a non-English speaking child taught
in English).
lems in the United States is that which involves millions of children of
limited English-speaking ability because they come from environments
where the dominant language is other than English . . . ." Pub. L. No.
90-247, Title VII, § 701,- 81 Stat. 816 (1968). The response has been the
Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880(b)(5) (1970), which allocated
funds of $135,000,000 through the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. Propos-
als to extend funding are being considered, H.R. 8877, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
tit. 11 (1973). Provisions with respect to financial assistance for bilingual
education programs can be found in 45 C.F.R. § 123 (1972). There are
three million schoolchildren in the United States from homes where Eng-
lish is not the language spoken. 1 T. ANDERSSON & M. BOYER, BILINGUAL
SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES, v (1970), which is an authoritative survey
of the subject. For information on some specific situations, see H.T.
MANUEL, SPANISH-SPEAKING CHILDREN OF THE SOUTHWEST-THEIR EDUCA-
TION AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE, 111-29 (1965); L.M. COOMBS, THE EDUCA-
TIONAL DISADVANTAGE OF THE INDIAN AMERICAN STUDENT, 60-64 (1970);
Hearings on Equal Educational Opportunity Before the Senate Select
Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
8, (1970), dealing with the educational situation of Puerto Rican children
in the nation's cities. Over 20 percent (250,000) of the schoolchildren in
New York City public schools are Puerto Rican. Id. at 3739. At the average
public school, the number of entering Puerto Rican children who are profi-
cient in English is negligible. Id. at 3704. Of those still in school by the
10th grade, over 56 percent drop out by the 12th grade. Id. The dropout
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The Lau plaintiffs pointed to one series of cases where equal treat-
ment of unequals was held insufficient under the equal protection
clause. In the criminal justice area, an affirmative state duty has
been found to compensate for inequalities that were not state
caused. Beginning with Griffin v. Illinois'" in 1956, the Supreme
Court has struck down a number of state requirements for money
payments as a condition to taking advantage of some aspect of the
criminal justice system," and, in recent years, of the civil justice
system as well." In Griffin, for example, indigent defendants suc-
cessfully challenged a state's charge of fees for transcripts which
were necessary for their appeals. The Court recognized that the
state had no explicit duty to provide an appeals system at all, and
that the state seemed neutral in offering it on the same terms to
everyone. This neutrality was held to be insubstantial. The Court,
per Mr. Justice Black, found that even though the poverty-which
prevented some from taking advantage of what the state offered to
all-was not state-created, the money requirement caused the grant
of appellate review to operate "in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty."'"
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, stating, inter alia, that the Court
was holding something new, namely that "the Equal Protection
Clause imposes on the States an affirmative duty to lift the handi-
rate for Puerto Rican children in Boston is estimated at 90 percent. Id. at
3707. Massachusetts mandates bilingual education for children who do not
speak English. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, §§ 1-9 (Supp. 1972). Cf.
Kobrick, A Model Act Providing for Transitional Bilingual Education Pro-
grams in Public Schools, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 260 (1972). New York and
California have legislation permitting some bilingual instruction. N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 3204(2)-(2a) (McKinney 1970); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 71, 6457
(West 1969).
46. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
47. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (longer imprisonment
in lieu of fine); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (appellate review of
criminal conviction); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel
on direct appeal). But cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (percentage
of bail as security upheld).
48. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (double security require-
ment for tenants in eviction proceedings), Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971) (divorce filing fee); But cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973) (filing fee for bankruptcy upheld).
49. 351 U.S. at 18.
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caps flowing from differences in economic circumstances. '"50 The
ninth circuit in Lau similarly described its view of plaintiffs' theory:
"the school has an affirmative duty to provide [the disadvantaged
student] special assistance to overcome his disabilities, whatever
the origin of those disabilities may be."
5
'
The reasoning of Griffin, applied to Lau, would be as follows: the
state has no duty to provide education, and the San Francisco Uni-
fied School District appears neutral in offering the same curriculum,
textbooks, etc. to everyone. This neutrality is insubstantial. Even
though the inability to understand English-which prevents some
from taking advantage of what the state offers to all-was not state-
created, the educational system operates in a way that discrimi-
nates against plaintiffs because of their national origin.
Such an analogy was tried in Lau, without success. The majori-
ty distinguished the indigent defendant cases on the ground that
while wealth has no rational relationship to the determination of
guilt, the teaching of English in schools is related to the fact that
ours is an English speaking nation. 2 This reasoning is open to the
attack made in the dissenting opinion that the plaintiffs were not
asking that all subjects be taught in a different language; all that
they sought to be taught in Chinese was the English language it-
self.53 In fact, the examples of the importance of English in national
life cited by the majority actually serve to show the importance of
the knowledge of English, and strengthen the claim of plaintiffs to
be taught the language-without it, they are not permitted to serve
50. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J. dissenting). "That holding produces the anom-
alous result that a constitutional admonition to the States to treat all
persons equally means in this instance that Illinois must give to some what
it requires others to pay for." Id. For the application of a similar view to
Lau, see text accompanying note 58 infra. There is an interesting discus-
sion of Justice Harlan's statement in Developments, supra note 14, at
1179-80.
51. 483 F.2d at 794.
52. For this proposition the court quotes from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 402 (1923) that the power of a State to require schools to be
taught in English "is not questioned." 483 F.2d at 796, n.11. It is suggested
that after the Lau plaintiffs had started their case, it still was not ques-
tioned. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
53. 483 F.2d at 802 (Hill, J. dissenting).
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on a jury, or to become naturalized citizens.54
The Griffin line of cases may be better distinguished on the
ground that trials, both civil and criminal, are explicitly covered in
the Constitution, where they are hedged with various guarantees,
especially in the criminal area. 5 Such a distinction would have been
in line with the emphasis in Supreme Court cases such as Rodriguez
on carefully seeking a Constitutional guarantee before recognizing
a right as fundamental. "
Accordingly, without much precedent for deciding whether equal
treatment of unequals can constitute a denial of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, the question reduces itself to the meaning of the
word "equal" in the phrase "equal treatment." Equality is not a
simple concept. 7 Whether people appear to be treated equally may
depend on where the observer stands. In Lau the majority empha-
sizes that the defendant school district gave equal teaching to plain-
tiffs and to others.5" The dissent, on the other hand, points out that
plaintiffs are receiving much less of that teaching than the others."
One excellent discussion notes that "treating people equally in one
respect always results in unequal treatment in some other re-
spect.""' Thus equality in the teaching programs offered to English
speaking and Chinese speaking students involves inequality in the
54. Id. at 798.
55. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI (guarantees jury and procedural
rights), VII (jury trial for civil cases), VII (no excessive bail or fine or cruel
and unusual punishment).
56. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
57. There is a good collection of authorities on the difficulties of defin-
ing the content of equality in Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A
Telophase of Substanative Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 76
n.130. Commentators have questioned whether fairness rather than equal-
ity would not be the better standard. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal
Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access
to the Court, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223, 244 (1970).
58. 483 F.2d at 799.
59. Id. at 801 (Hill, J., dissenting).
60. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1179. This would not be true
in a situation where "all men were identical-similar in every respect
except that they were distinct individuals . . ." Id. at 1164. If plaintiffs
spoke English to the same degree as their classmates, no inequality would
arise from the school's treatment of them similarly with their English
speaking classmates.
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access that the two groups of students have to the education being
offered.' Compensatory English instruction, an attempt to give the
Chinese speaking students equal access to education, would involve
inequality in the programs offered to them and other students.
If treating people equally in one respect is to result in unequal
treatment in another respect, then the state's action is bound to
result in some inequality. It is suggested that equality in what is a
less important aspect of the state's treatment should not be held to
justify a resulting inequality in what is a more important aspect. In
Griffin, appellate review was the significant issue,"2 with transcripts,
merely a means to the end of better appellate review, and the fees
charged by the state little more than a means to expedite the pre-
paration of transcripts. When the fees for the transcripts were equal,
the result was the unequal availability of appellate review, and
consequently the more essential goal was not being served. In Lau,
the textbooks and teachers are apparently present for the purpose
of giving the students an education. It is difficult to see why equality
in these facilities should suffice to permit unequal access" to educa-
ton.
Plaintiffs are asking for somewhat novel relief; but they have
some equitable considerations on their side. They may find the
deciding factor to be the Court's view of the Rodriguez case as it
relates to Lau. Even if education is assumed to be similar to other
social welfare issues, a stricter scrutiny and a heavier burden of
state justification might be required in Lau than in Rodriguez. In
Rodriguez, Justice Powell found it difficult to define the aggrieved
class. 4 In Lau that class is easily defined; in fact, all of its members
could be named. In Rodriguez, the Court saw a relative inequality
of benefit, not a total deprivation.65 In Lau, it is arguable that plain-
61. For a discussion of the idea of "access" see note 66 infra and accom-
panying text.
62. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1179: "the Court required non-
discriminatory treatment with respect to satisfying what it took to be the
interest really at stake-that of actually being able to acquire a transcript
in order to bring an effective appeal." Id.
63. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
64. 411 U.S. at 28-29. Justice Powell finally describes "a large, diverse,
and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in
districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. Id.
at 28.
65. See note 20 supra.
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tiffs were totally deprived of education.
In the last analysis, what ought to be made equal is not just the
school facilities, or the learning actually achieved by the students,
but the "access" that the students have to the education offered."
It would appear that if someone does not understand the language
of instruction, his access to education is totally blocked; if one does
not understand a substantial part of the language, one's access is
effectively blocked. Whether the Chinese speaking students of San
Francisco are deprived of the minimum quantum of education that
may be constitutionally protected according to language in
Rodriguez67 is at least an open question. Certainly their situation is
such that, to adopt and invert the words of Rodriguez, a "charge
fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and participation in the political
process."8
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Non-Degradation-Clean Air Act
and Amendments Held to Mandate a Policy Prohibiting Signifi-
cant Deterioration of Air Quality in Areas of Relatively Clean
Air. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), aff'g sub nom. by an
equally divided court Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 41 U.S.L.W. 2255
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff'g 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
In May, 1972 the Sierra Club and other environmental groups'
66. Cf. Yudof, supra note 44, where he suggests that equal resources
made available to each child constitutes equal access without compensa-
tory programs; but that the child who is taught in English but does not
understand English is an example of "blatant denials of equality that
effectively block access to the resources of the educational system" and
thus an example of the sort of case where a general rejection of "any
reference to differential needs or schooling outcomes," may not be feasible.
Id. at 475. It is clear that the question is one of equal access, or in extreme
cases, access at all. It is suggested, however, that the question should be
seen as access to education itself, rather than to facilities or even resources,
in order to resolve the equal protection paradox posed by the case of non-
English speaking student.
67. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
68. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
1. The other plaintiffs were the Metropolitan Washington Coalition for
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filed suit2 in the District Court for the District of Columbia against
Clean Air, New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water, Inc., and the
Clean Air Council of San Diego County. By the time the case was heard
in the Supreme Court, 19 states had filed amicus curiae briefs in support
of the plaintiffs' position: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illi-
nois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, and Vermont. Those states supporting EPA's position were Arizona
and Utah.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970) provides for citizen suits against the
Administrator for alleged failure to perform mandatory functions as fol-
lows: "(a) Except as [otherwise] provided . . . any person may commence
a civil action on his own behalf. . . (2) against the Administrator where
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator. The
district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties. . . to order the Administrator
to perform such an act or duty, as the case may be." Id. This suit was the
first under this provision of the Act. There have been cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970), which states that "[a] petition for review
of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any implemen-
tation plan under section 1857c-5 . . . may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit." See, e.g., Getty Oil
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del.), aff'd, 467 F.2d 349 (3d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 937 (1973). Here, however, the Sierra
Club argued that the Administrator's refusal to assert his authority
amounted to a failure to perform a non-discretionary act or duty, which
the court found to be "precisely the type of claim which Congress . . .
intended interested citizens to raise in the district courts. In view of this
clear jurisdictional grant, the Administrator's assertion that plaintiffs
should await his approval of the state plans (formulated, in part, pursuant
to his allegedly illegal regulation) and then proceed to appeal his approval
under 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 is, in our opinion, untenable." 344 F. Supp. at
254-55. EPA did not contest plaintiffs' standing to sue. Nonetheless, the
court decided that requisite standing existed, even under the limitation
expressed in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)-that an organiza-
tion must assert harm to itself or its individual members in order to have
standing to maintain an action. Plaintiffs were found to have alleged facts
which indicated that their members would have been adversely affected
by the Administrator's inaction. 344 F. Supp. at 254. The interest which
allegedly would be injured reflected "'aesthetic, conservational, and recre-
ational' as well as economic values" which the Supreme Court had ruled
acceptable in Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970) and reaffirmed in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
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William D. Ruckelshaus, then Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).' Plaintiffs alleged that a regulation4 pro-
mulgated by the Administrator which permitted significant deterio-
ration of existing air quality in areas where air quality was better
than federally mandated secondary standards was invalid.5 In addi-
tion, plaintiffs sought to prohibit approval of any state implementa-
tion plan' which did not include measures to prevent deterioration
and to maintain standards of air quality in areas where air quality
was better than that required by law.7 The district court, in the only
opinion issued in this case, granted an injunction which barred ap-
proval of state plans that fail to provide for non-deterioration and
ordered EPA to draft new regulations conforming to the non-
degradation policy.8 This decision was summarily upheld by a unan-
3. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 41 U.S.L.W. 2255 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff'd sub nor. by an equally divided Court, Fri v. Sierra
Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). Ruckelshaus, the Administrator of EPA when
suit was originally brought, was no longer at EPA when the case was heard
by the Supreme Court, Robert W. Fri was Acting Administrator.
4. 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b) (1973).
5. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970), the Administra-
tor is to publish regulations prescribing both primary and secondary am-
bient air quality standards. The contested regulation concerned only sec-
ondary standards. Primary standards are promulgated to protect the pub-
lic health; secondary standards to protect the public welfare, which in-
cludes, but is not limited to: "effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation,
man-made materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate,
damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation,
as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-
being." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(h) (1970).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) sets the procedure for state submission
of implementation plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970) sets the criteria
that must be included in a state plan before the Administrator can approve
it. Significantly, effective procedures to control pollution sources including
land use and air and surface transportation controls, are among the cri-
teria.
7. 344 F. Supp. at 256.
8. Id. at 257. The court granted injunctive relief based upon the four
criteria set forth in Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1116
(D.C. Cir. 1969) and Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d
921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958): substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
irreparable harm would follow from denial; only a limited inconvenience
would accrue to the opposing party, and the public interest was in the
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imous court of appeals,9 and affirmed without opinion by the Su-
preme Court in a 4-4 vote.0
Although the Court was equally divided and issued no opinion,
the case is significant because of its impact on the administrative
agency responsible for federal environmental programs. The Admin-
istrator must now enforce non-degradation standards and establish
an aggressive federal air pollution program-even in clean air areas.
Since air quality will not be permitted to deteriorate as an area is
built up, land use planning gains in significance. A greater apprecia-
tion for a regional approach to the administration of metropolitan
areas," in which various levels of government work together, 2 must
result from this decision. Pollution problems must now be dealt with
at their source, rather than exported from one jurisdiction to an-
plaintiff's favor.
9. 41 U.S.L.W. 2255 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972). The court of appeals
issued no opinion. Instead, by unanimous vote, it summarily approved the
judgment of the district court.
10. 412 U.S. 541 (1973). Because it takes a majority to reverse, an
evenly divided vote of the Court affirms the next lower court decision.
Generally, when the Court is evenly divided, no opinions are issued. See,
e.g., McGrath v. Kaku Nagano, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); United States v.
Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624 (1940); Chicago, St. P., Minn. &
Omaha Ry. v. Roberts, 164 U.S. 703 (1896). "The statement which always
accompanies a judgment in such case, that it is rendered by a divided
court, is only intended to show that there was a division among the judges
upon the questions of law or fact involved, not that there was any disagree-
ment as to the judgment to be entered upon such division. It serves to
explain the absence of any opinion in the cause, and prevents the decision
from becoming an authority for other cases of like character. But the
judgment is as conclusive and binding in every respect upon the parties
as if rendered upon the concurrence of all the judges upon every question
involved in the case." Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113
(1868).
11. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AND RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 134 (1968) [hereinafter
referred to as URBAN AND RURAL AMERICA]; COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEV.,
RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 42-50 (1970) [hereinafter
referred to as RESHAPING GOVERNMENT].
12. See Dyckman, Rationale for a National Urban Policy, in PLANNING
FOR A NATION OF CITIES 23, 30-31 (S.B. Warner, Jr. ed. 1966); Fagin, The
Evolving Philosophy of Urban Planning, in 1 URBAN RESEARCH AND POLICY
PLANNING 309, 319-20 (Urban Affairs Annual Reviews 1967).
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other. 3
The federal government first entered the field of air pollution in
1955, under the aegis of an act authorizing the Surgeon General to
collect and disseminate pollution information. The Act also pro-
vided "grants-in-aid to State and local . . . air pollution control
agencies . . . for research, training, and demonstration projects."' 4
Eight years later, the Clean Air Act of 19631" gave the United States
Public Health Service a broader role in dealing with air pollution
control," and recognized the need for regional cooperation."7 Under
the Clean Air Act the states became the central unit for receiving
grants-in-aid. Incentives for regional cooperation were provided
through a program of federal reimbursement to interstate or inter-
municipal agencies which established, developed, and improved air
pollution programs." The Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) was given the authority to compile,
publish, and revise scientific criteria of air quality necessary to pro-
tect the public health and welfare throughout the nation."
The 1967 amendments0 to the Clean Air Act empowered the Sec-
retary of HEW to designate broad atmospheric areas and, for the
purpose of establishing ambient air quality standards,2' to specify
13. See, e.g., Hilst, Pollution: Another Dimension of Urbanization, in
TOWARD A NATIONAL URBAN PoLIcy 94, 104 (D.P. Moynihan ed. 1970).
14. Air Pollution Control Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322, 23,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857, 1857a-18571 (1970), as amended, (Supp.
1970).
15. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-
571 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
16. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 8(b), 77 Stat. 400, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857g, 1857h (1970).
17. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 2, 77 Stat. 393, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1857a (1970).
18. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 4, 77 Stat. 395, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
19. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 3, 77 Stat. 394-95, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857b, 1857c (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
20. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
21. Ambient air quality standards are set for air which exists through-
out a community. A broad atmospheric area referred to in the test is any
interstate area, or major interstate area, which the Administrator deems
necessary or appropriate to attain and maintain ambient air quality stan-
dards. 40 C.F.R. § 81.1 et seq. (1973).
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air quality control regions based on jurisdictional boundaries,
urban-industrial concentrations, and other relevant factors."2 Con-
gress, recognizing the national scope of the air pollution problem,
sought to provide for flexible regional plans23 which would encourage
cooperation among all levels of government. 4 The legislation pro-
vided that states would set standards initially, using criteria pub-
lished by the Secretary of HEW, and adopt implementation plans
to meet the regional air quality standards as set by EPA.25
As amended in 1970,26 the Clean Air Act requires the Administra-
tor of EPA to establish national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards. 7 As the mechanism for meeting the primary and
secondary standards, each state must submit a state implementa-
tion plan to the Administrator for approval. 8 The plan must provide
for "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of primary
and secondary standards." States are permitted to impose stricter
controls than required by federal primary and secondary stan-
dards.30 If the Administrator rejects any portion of the state plan
because it does not comply with the requirements of the Act, he
22. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 107, 84 Stat. 1678, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-2 (1970).
23. Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108, 81 Stat. 491, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970).
24. Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 102, 81 Stat. 485-86, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1857a (1970).
25. Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c)(1)-(4), 81 Stat. 492-93, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6,
c-8, h-4, h-5 (Supp. 1970). The Air Quality Act of 1967 itself consisted of
amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392
(formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857-571 (1964)). For a detailed study
of the 1970 Amendments see Trumbull, Federal Control of Stationary
Source Air Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283 (1972). See also Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 GEO. L.J. 153 (1972).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a)(1) (1970). See note 5 supra, for discussion
of primary and secondary standards. The Administrator also has responsi-
bility for promulgating new standards of performance for various emission
standards, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-7, f-1, f-9 (1970); id. § 1857c-6 (Supp.
1970), also increasing the federal enforcement role.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1857d-1.
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must promulgate his own regulations to replace the disapproved
portion.3
Plaintiffs in the instant case were concerned with those areas with
air cleaner than that required by administratively set secondary
standards and which would be endangered without EPA or state
enforcement of a non-degradation policy.32 At issue was whether
the Clean Air Act required the Administrator to enforce a non-
degradation program. The dispute arose because the Administrator
promulgated contradictory regulations. In April, 1971, the EPA
adopted national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards, which included the regulation plaintiffs were seeking to
compel the Administrator to enforce. The regulation anticipated a
non-degradation policy and provided that:
The promulgation of national primary and secondary air quality standards
shall not be considered in any manner to allow significant deterioration of
existing air quality in any portion of any State3
In August, 1971, EPA issued the Requirements for Preparation,
Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, containing a reg-
ulation contrasting sharply with the previously formulated require-
ment:
In any region where measured or estimated ambient levels of a pollutant are
below the levels specified by an applicable secondary standard the state
implementation plan shall be adequate to prevent such ambient pollution
levels from exceeding such secondary standard . 3
The district court reasoned that:
The former regulation appears to reflect a policy of nondegradation of clean
air but the latter mirrors the Administrator's doubts as to his authority to
impose such a policy upon the states in their implementation plans. In our
view, these regulations are irreconcilable and they demonstrate the weakness
of the Administrator's position in this case.3
Plaintiffs contended that the newer regulation violated both the
letter and the policy of the Clean Air Act.36 They argued that the
31. Id. § 1857c-5.
32. Non-degradation means that the existing air quality in a given area
will not be allowed to deteriorate.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(c) (1973).
34. Id. § 51.12(b).
35. 344 F. Supp. at 256.
36. The present version of the 1963 act, as amended by the 1967 act
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language, legislative history, prior administrative interpretation of
the Act and amendments thereto consistently and accurately
evinced a commitment to a federally enforced policy of non-
degradation. The Administrator, however, testified before Congress
that he lacked the authority to impose requirments forbidding dete-
rioration in areas with relatively clean air, and that such authority
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to administer."
Several criteria have evolved as guidelines for courts to evaluate
the authoritative effect of an administrative agency's rules and reg-
ulations. These include: special expertise of the agency; lack of
expertise of the court; any indication of legislative approval of the
rules; contemporaneous construction (interpretations at the time of
the enactment by administrators who were especially informed of
the legislative intent) and long standing rules." Having weighed
these factors, the district court held" that the later regulation"
contradicted the true intent of Congress which had been accurately
expressed in previous administrative interpretations.4'
The district court observed that the Secretary of HEW had origi-
and the 1970 amendments, is properly referred to as the Clean Air Act. See
note 26, supra.
37. Testimony of William D. Ruckelshaus, Clean Air Act Oversight,
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
530-31 (1972). Congressman Paul Rogers, among others, disagreed with
this position. Id. at 531. See also 344 F. Supp. at 256.
38. For a complete discussion of these criteria, and of administrative
rulemaking generally, see K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 5.01-
06, at 123-38 (3d ed. 1972).
39. 344 F. Supp. at 255-56.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b) (1973).
41. See 344 F. Supp. at 255-56, for the district court's indirect refer-
ences to many of these factors. "[T]he rulings, interpretations and opin-
ions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See also McLaren v.
Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1920).
19731
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
nally been charged with the administration of federal air and water
pollution control legislation. 2 Both the Secretary of HEW, Robert
Finch, and Under Secretary of HEW, John G. Veneman, testified43
that, in their view, the existing 1967 and proposed 1970 Act prohib-
ited significant deterioration of air quality." An argument was made
that the 1967 Act was "intended to deal primarily with those areas
which were critically polluted."' 5 However, HEW's National Air
Pollution Control Administration, the predecessor of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, promulgated guidelines indicating that
significant deterioration of air quality would conflict with the ex-
pressed purpose of the law.4" The administering department which
42. 344 F. Supp. at 255. Only in 1970 was this responsibility shifted to
the Administrator of EPA. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(a)(1), 3
C.F.R. § 1072 (1973) (eff. Dec. 2, 1970) (referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 1857
(1970)).
43. 344 F. Supp. at 255.
44. Hearings on Air Pollution before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Public Works Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33,
143 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Committee Hearings]; Hearings
on Air Pollution Control and Solid Waste Recycling Before the Subcomm.
on Public Health and Welfare of the House Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 197, 280, 287 (1970). During the Senate
Committee Hearings, the following discussion occurred: "Senator Cooper
... . you said that if the region or an area had a certain air quality which
might be higher than other areas of the country, that that would be main-
tained. It could not be degraded; is that correct? Mr. Veneman. Yes. We
pointed out we did not want deterioration of the air in those areas that may
be below what the standard is at the present time." Senate Committee
Hearings, supra, at 159.
45. Note, The Clean Air Act and the Concept of Non-Degradation:
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 801, 819 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as The Concept of Non-Degradation]. This Note does does distin-
guish, however, between legislative history, which may indeed seem to
have been unconcerned with non-degradation, and administrative inter-
pretation of legislation. In actuality, the language of the 1967 Act is un-
clear; it appears to be primarily concerned with areas already heavily
polluted, although it does refer to "enhancement" of the air,. and much
mention was made of the phrase "no haven for polluters anywhere in the
country." S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
46. "[A]n explicit purpose of the Act is to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources. Air quality standards which, even if
fully implemented, would result in significant deterioration of air quality
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participated in most of the committee hearings, and which origi-
nally promulgated non-degradation guidelines, was HEW, and the
construction of the Act by its officials was, in the court's view,4"
more indicative of legislative intent than the EPA position asserted
by Mr. Ruckelshaus. In promulgating the earlier regulation,"8 the
Administrator adhered to the previous HEW policy of non-
degradation.
The court found additional support for its view in the legislative
history of the Clean Air Act,49 beginning with the Air Quality Act
of 1967.50 The 1967 Act had amended and strengthened the purpose
provision of the 1963 Clean Air Act5' to read "to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources . '.'.."52 The statute in-
creased the role of the federal government. In particular, the Secre-
tary of HEW was required to establish both air quality control re-
gions and air quality criteria.5 3 The court, while not concerned with
the legal enforceability of these criteria,5 was conscious of their
value as pointing up "the significance of the 'protect and enhance'
language [of the Act] .... , Through this expansion of his role,
in any substantial portions of an air quality region clearly would conflict
with this expressed purpose of the law." NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
ADMINISTRATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR QUALITY STAN-
DARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS, Part. I, § 1.51, at 7 (HEW, 1969) (em-
phasis added).
47. 344 F. Supp. at 255, 256.
48. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
49. 344 F. Supp. at 255.
50. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-
571 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
51. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1(b)(1), 77 Stat. 394, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970). See note 55, infra.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). See also note 71
infra and accompanying text. Contrast this with the language of the Clean
Air Act of 1963, which, although expanding the federal role, see notes 14-
19 supra and accompanying text, simply provided that "[t]he purposes
of this Act are to protect . . . the Nation's air resources so as to promote
the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its popula-
tion." Pub. L. No. 88-206 § 1(b)(1), 77 Stat. 394, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
1857(b)(1) (1970).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c(2) (1970).
54. 344 F. Supp. at 255. The Guidelines had apparently never been
published in the Federal Register.
55. Id. referring to the Air Quality Act of 1967. It is interesting to note,
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the Secretary of HEW became a regional planner for the air, and
"all areas of the country were to come under the protection of the
Act."
The Sierra Club contended that the Senate Report on the 1967
Act "made clear that the Act was designed to improve air quality
throughout the country, including areas with relatively clean air."57
While not quite so explicit, the Report does state that:
The prime purpose of the proposed legislation is to strengthen the Clean Air
Act, to expedite a national program of air quality improvement, and to en-
hance the quality of the atmosphere . . .against long-term hazards and
immediate danger ....
The Air Quality Act of 1967, therefore, serves notice that no one has the right
to use the atmosphere as a garbage dump, and that there will be no haven
for polluters anywhere in the country."
The Report further asserts that "the objective [of the Act] is to
achieve clean air," and its purpose is to "enhance air quality and
to reduce harmful emissions anywhere in the country."59 From the
court's perspective, Congress intended to view the air pollution
problem as a national one, requiring strong federal programs to deal
with air quality control.60
however, that there are some cases which indicate that guidelines pub-
lished by a federal agency would not have to be published in the Federal
Register to be binding. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (holding
the manual of the State Department to be binding on it); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding that a
Department of Transportation order "constitutes the law in effect." Id. at
419). Thus, these "requirements" might actually have been held to have
the force of law, although some supporters of EPA's position had argued
otherwise.
56. 344 F. Supp. at 255.
57. Brief for the Sierra Club as Respondent at 25, Fri v. Sierra Club,
412 U.S. 541 (1973).
58. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
59. Id. at 2, 3. See also Senator Muskie's similar comments, 113 CONG.
REc. 19171, 32476 (1967). The idea of clean air being allowed to become
polluted obviously concerned the court, as was brought out in The Concept
of Non-Degradation, supra note 45, at 810 n.47: "As one EPA official put
it: 'It's a hard position to fight. They [the circuit judges] just kept asking
[during oral argument]: 'Well, do you mean you're going to let clean air
get dirty?'"
60. 344 F. Supp. at 256-57. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
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In 1970 Congress determined that the enforcement procedures of
the 1967 Act were inadequate and amended it to "intensify the war
against air pollution."'" The 1970 House Report emphasized that
"[e]ffective pollution control requires both reduction of present
pollution and prevention of new significant pollution problems.""2
To "fight" this intensified "war," Congress expanded the federal
role and granted new authority to the EPA. 3 The states were told"4
that if they failed to fulfill their responsibilities, EPA would direct
them to follow EPA issued regulations." If the House Report did not
specifically support non-degradation," the 1970 Senate Report cer-
tainly did:
In areas where current air pollution levels are already equal to or better than
The court was obviously influenced by the content of debates and discus-
sions during all the hearings on air quality control.
61. H. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). There was also a
growing awareness of the need for stronger federal authority and responsi-
bility in the executive office: "[W]ithout effective Federal standards,
states and.communities that require such controls find themselves at a
similar [serious economic] disadvantage in attracting industry against
more permissive rivals." 116 CONG. REc. 32909 (1970) (President's Message
on the Environment). Even the future Administrator of EPA had recog-
nized the need for strong federal controls: "I believe . . [the states] . . .
can become more effective if there is a strong Federal presence behind
them." Hearings on the Nomination of William D. Ruckelshaus before the
Senate Public Works Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
62. H. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). When the House
Committee was debating the 1970 Amendments, a spokesman for the
chemical industry requested that a provision be included to qualify what
he believed to be "antidegradation" language. Hearings on Air Pollution
Control and Solid Waste Recycling Before the Subcomm. on Public Health
and Welfare of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 465 (1970). Congressman Rogers, in reply, claimed that
such a provision would allow a clean air area to become polluted, merely
forcing drastic action at a later time, while trying to maintain clean air
areas as pure as possible would eliminate the need to "go back like we are
thinking of doing now to build up support to clean up the environment."
Id. at 475.
63. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. 1970). See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-2, -5, d-1 (1970).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
66. See 344 F. Supp. at 255.
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the air quality goals, the Secretary should not approve any implementation
plan which does not provide, to the maximum extent practicable, for the
continued maintenance of such ambient air quality. 7
There were further indicia that Congress intended to incorporate
a non-degradation policy into the 1970 Act. 8 Congress had re-
enacted the first basic purpose provision: "to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." 9
This language was interpreted by several witnesses and Congress-
men during the hearings on the bill'" as incorporating or implying a
non-degradation policy.7
67. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (emphasis added).
See also 344 F. Supp. at 255.
68. 344 F. Supp. at 255. Although the court did not include any men-
tion of the title of the Act as indicative of congressional intent, it follows
that the Clean Air Act is concerned with clean air. See, e.g., FTC v.
Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, wherein the title of an act was held indicative
of its purpose.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970).
70. See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 44. Dr. John T. Mid-
dleton, Commissioner of the National Air Pollution Control Administra-
tion, testified about the 1970 act. When asked whether it was necessary for
each state to include a non-degradation plan in its implementation pro-
gram, he replied: "Since the Clean Air Act states, in section 101, that it is
national policy to protect and enhance air quality, I think it would be very
appropriate to have this policy reiterated in the other sections, where ac-
tion is prescribed. I am sort of against the word, 'nondegradation.' I think
there is a more positive way to say it-protection and enhancement." Id.
at 1517.
71. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Public Works Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972). Richard Ayres,
of the National Resources Defense Council, testified that he thought the
Act did not specify non-degradation as a requirement, but that the
legislative history apparently favored such a policy. Id. at 12. Senator
Thomas Eagleton, vice-chairman of the subcommittee presiding over the
hearings, disagreed, reiterating the position that protect and enhance are
the equivalent of non-degradation, and also stating that this language is
similar to "language that existed in the previous 1967 air act which was
taken to mean non-degradation, and that policy was frequently discussed
in the deliberations on this bill . . . .So I think nondegradation was in
the 1970 law, very much is in the 1970 law, and has to be part of the
implementation plan submitted by a State." Id. at 14-15. Professor Wil-
liam H. Rodgers of the University of Washington Law School agreed that
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Relying heavily on the foregoing history, the district court ruled
that the Clean Air Act of 1970 was based in large part on a policy
of non-degradation." By its equally divided vote (and lack of opin-
ion), the Supreme Court 3 let stand the unanimous (summary) deci-
sion of the court of appeals74 upholding this judgment. Conse-
quently, the Administrator can neither issue regulations which
would permit significant deterioration in clean air areas nor approve
state implementation plans which do not include assurances that no
significant deterioration will be allowed." Still at issue is the mean-
ing of "significant,"7 which the EPA could be required to define,"
subject to judicial review.
EPA must be flexible in adopting regulations to provide for non-
degradation, but such flexibility must not destroy the basic concept'
of keeping clean air areas as pure as possible." It is unlikely that
protect and enhance incorporated the policy of non-degradation, adding:
"I think clearly if EPA has the authority to continuously strengthen its
ambient air standards, then it seems to me they have the authority to
predict that potential by reference to a nondegradation standard." Id. at
142.
72. 344 F. Supp. at 256.
73. 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
74. 41 U.S.L.W. 2255 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972).
75. 412 U.S. 541 (1973).'The requested relief was an injunction against
such action, therefore, the Court's acceptance of the judgment results in
the stated prohibitions.
76. See 38 FED. REG. 18985, 18986-87 (1973), for EPA's discussion of
what may constitute significant deterioration. See also Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the court considered
the meaning of "significant" in relation to the problems of pollution.
77. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584
(D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court ruled that the Secretary of HEW (later
the Administrator of EPA), in refusing to suspend federal registration of
DDT as a pesticide, had to "articulate the standards and principles that
govern [such] discretionary decisions," subject to "strict judicial scru-
tiny." Id. at 598.
78. In a similar situation involving the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, EPA diluted stringent non-degradation enforcement efforts. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970), as amended, Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. A clause similar
to the "protect and enhance" clause of the Clean Air Act resulted in an
official administrative policy of non-degradation. Despite positive guide-
lines, however, an escape option was permitted in state implementation
plans. See The Concept of Non-Degradation, supra note 46, at 830-35 for
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many escape options can be adopted for the Clean Air Act. Despite
assertions that Congress was unusually silent on the economic im-
plicatons of the Act during debate and hearings,"9 Senator Eagleton
had stated quite clearly, in questioning a witness:
[Isn't it clear from the legislative history of this act that the House version
of the 1970 bill, had, time and again, references to economic factors and
economic costs, and those were stricken from the bill in conference, that
insofar as protection of public health was concerned, there is no economic
factor to be considered?"
EPA can now take positive control in setting standards for com-
prehensive planning of future land use on a regional as well as state-
wide basis, with sufficient authority to enforce compliance. More-
over, now that no state implementation plans can be approved with-
out non-degradation provisions, industry will not be attracted to
other states with less stringent air pollution standards. As a result,
the economic competition which exists among states has been effec-
tively eliminated as a stumbling block to stringent anti-pollution
measures.
In accordance with the Supreme Court decision,8' EPA has out-
lined four possible non-degradation alternatives:" a freeze on the
amount of soot (particulate matter) and sulfur dioxide at 1972 lev-
els; a 20 percent limit on any increase of these emissions; a direction
to states to proceed on a case-by-case basis; and a requirement that
states establish pure air zones for limited industrial development.
EPA also announced a 90-day schedule for hearings on the options. 3
Despite the lack of a majority, the Supreme Court has affirmed
a comparison of these Acts, as well as an excellent analysis of both parties'
positions prior to the district court opinion in the instant case. See also
Note, The Management of Air Quality: Legal Structures and Official
Behavior, 3 ENVIRON. L. REV. 93 (1972).
79. See The Concept of Non-Degradation, supra note 45, at 821-22
n.118.
80. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Public Works Comm. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1972). The Senate
had earlier recognized the economic issue, and concluded: "The Commit-
tee recognizes the potential economic . . . risk . . . . Such a risk must
• . . be assumed if the nation's air resources are to be conserved and en-
hanced. . . ." 116 CONG. REC. 32902 (1970).
81. 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
82. EPA Proposed Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 18985 (1973).
83. Id. at 18995.
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that the Clean Air Act requires a national policy of non-degradation
if its goals are to be met.84 Future rulings may determine whether
specific state plans for implementation are consistent with the con-
gressional mandate, and whether EPA is taking the active role man-
dated to it.
GRAND JURY-Secrecy of Testimony-Protection Afforded by
Traditional Rule of Secrecy is Waived by a Witness Who Seeks
Disclosure. In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973).
During the 1973 New York City primary campaign, local newspa-
pers reported that appellant, a United States Congressman and a
candidate for Mayor, had refused to answer a number of questions
concerning his personal finances during an appearance before a fed-
eral grand jury.' Denying these reports, Congressman Biaggi moved
for an order whereby a panel of three judges of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York would review
the grand jury minutes and deliver an opinion as to whether he had
refused to answer any questions concerning his personal finances.
The panel was to respond to a carefully worded question submitted
by the Congressman.' While this motion was pending, the United
84. EPA argues that the Supreme Court did not decide whether the
Clean Air Act requires prevention of significant deterioration of air quality.
Instead, the Administrator, somewhat petulantly, views the decision as
mandating EPA to approve state implementation plans that will "attain
and maintain the national ambient air quality standards [which it was
already authorized to do], and that the Act does not require EPA or the
States to prevent significant deterioration of air quality. EPA Proposed
Regulation, 38 FED. REG. 18986 (1973). However, EPA accepts the judg-
ment of the Court, which forbids EPA from approving state plans which
do not provide for such non-degradation. EPA is indulging in circular
reasoning, as it must obey the judgment of the Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court's decision, although a 4-4 vote, approved, on the merits,
the policy of non-degradation.
1. The story was first reported in the New York Times by Nicholas
Gage. Based on "authoritative sources," he reported that Congressman
Biaggi was summoned before a federal grand jury investigating private
immigration bills sponsored by congressmen. He was later called back and
asked questions on several subjects, including his personal finances. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
2. "During the appearance of Petitioner Mario Biaggi before a Federal
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States Attorney moved for the release of part of Congressman
Biaggi's grand jury testimony, redacted to eliminate the name of
any other persons. The district court granted the United States
Attorney's motion and denied that of Congressman Biaggi.3 After
obtaining a stay of the district court order pending an appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Congressman Biaggi
moved in the district court for full disclosure of the grand jury
minutes without deletions of any names. The denial of this motion
was likewise appealed.4
The court of appeals, per Chief Judge Friendly, affirmed the dis-
trict court's order to release an edited transcript of the grand jury
minutes. Reaffirming the traditional need for grand jury secrecy,
the court held that the motion for full release of the grand jury
testimony, without deletions, constituted a waiver of the protection
afforded by the secrecy rule. Since full disclosure could be damaging
to others named in the testimony, the court ordered release of Con-
gressman Biaggi's testimony with all other names and personal ref-
erences deleted.5
The origin of the grand jury may be traced as far back as the reign
of Henry II and his struggle with the Church for control of the
machinery of justice.' Initially, the proceedings of the grand jury
Grand Jury on or about October 29, 1971, and November 26, 1971, was
there any question put to Petitioner Mario Biaggi about his personal fi-
nances or assets which question Petitioner Mario Biaggi refused to answer
by invoking his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or any
other constitutional privilege?" Brief for Petitioner at 1, In re Biaggi, Index
No. Ml1-188 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1973).
3. In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1973).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 493.
6. The King's desire to expand royal authority over the courts stemmed
from two concerns: first, the need for revenue, which could be satisfied by
collecting the fines and fees collected by the baronial courts, and second,
the Church's power in the secular realm. In the Assize of Clarendon (1166)
Henry II introduced the precursor of the modern grand jury, which was to
take the place of the existing compurgation system. The new procedure
called for a "jury" of twelve men selected from the locality to "present,"
or accuse the suspect. The effect was to wrest a substantial amount of
power and revenue from both the barons and the church and to greatly
increase the authority of the crown. Schwartz, Demythologizing the His-
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were open to public scrutiny,' and it was not until 1681 that secrecy
became a recognized part of grand jury procedure.' Secrecy has
since become established as an essential part of grand jury proceed-
ings,' and is a policy "older than our Nation itself."'"
The reasons which are put forward to justify grand jury secrecy
are most often summarized as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and
to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning
the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the
witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial
of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing
trial where there was no probability of guilt."
In the federal system grand jury secrecy is the subject of rule 6(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for lim-
ited disclosure of the proceedings. 2 The broadest allowance is made
toric Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 703-10 (1972).
7. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 456 (1965).
8. Id. at 457. Grand jury secrecy was established at the Earl of Shaftes-
bury Trial, as a result of the grand juror's refusal to indict despite heavy
royal pressure. The jurors demanded to hear witnesses in closed chambers.
When the King refused they returned an indictment with the word "ignor-
amous" or, "we know nothing of it," written across it. The history of this
case is presented in Schwartz, supra note 6, at 710-21.
9. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
10. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399
(1959).
11. United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254,261 (D.
Md. 1931). See also United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
681 n.6 (1958); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954);
Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1939).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) reads in pertinent part: "disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote
of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter,
stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes
recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury
only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the
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to government attorneys, who may inspect and use the minutes of
the grand jury in the performance of their duties, without prior court
approval. 3 In all other cases, disclosures may be made only at the
discretion of the court, "preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding," or when there may be grounds to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
Heretofore rule 6(e) had been the measure of the court's power of
disclosure, 4 to be exercised in its sound discretion.'" The rule pro-
vides that in no case will the deliberations or the individual votes
of the grand jurors be released. 6
Within these guidelines courts have used their discretionary pow-
ers in a variety of circumstances. In Metzler v. United States,7
involving a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture and
sell alcohol, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss
the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No
obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accord-
ance with this rule." Note that the rule does not impose any obligation of
secrecy on witnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), Advisory Committee Note.
13. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). See also 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 417 (1966).
14. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398-99
(1959); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 1952); In re Bullock,
103 F. Supp. 639, 641 (D.D.C. 1952).
15. 360 U.S. at 399; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 233, rehearing denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940). The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in denying a motion for inspection of grand jury minutes
by FTC investigators, considered a number of decisions that permitted
disclosure. The court then stated: "The decision of the court in each of
those cases [the cases permitting disclosure], consistent with established
principles, rested on a determination that under the facts presented the
interests of justice outweighed the countervailing policy of secrecy. ...
The courts have uniformly held that a petition or motion for leave to
inspect grand jury evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge, to be dealt with by him in light of the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. This discretion should be exercised favorably to disclo-
sure only when it is persuasively shown that the ends of justice require it.
The action of the trial judge on such a petition or motion may not be
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." In re Grand JuryProceeings,
309 F.2d 440, 444 (3d Cir. 1962) (citations omitted). See also note 41 infra.
16. See note 12 supra.
17. 64 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933).
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trial court's decision to permit a witness, an Assistant United
States Attorney, to read from his shorthand notes taken at a session
of the grand jury. The actual transcript of the defendant's grand
jury testimony. was later substituted in the court record for the
witness' notes. The court rejected an absolute rule holding that
"[wihere the ends of justice can be furthered thereby and when the
reasons for secrecy no longer exist, the policy of the law requires that
the veil of secrecy be raised."'"
The greatest amount of controversy has surrounded attempts by
defendants in later judicial proceedings to secure disclosure of grand
jury testimony. In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,'9 a civil
suit was instituted by the government when a grand jury investigat-
ing possible violations of the Sherman Act failed to hand down an
indictment. Defendants sought discovery and production of the
grand jury transcript under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.0 Noting that grand jury secrecy is a well established
doctrine worthy of protection,2' the Supreme Court held that a "par-
ticularized need" to release the testimony must be shown in order
to overcome the need for secrecy and to satisfy the "good cause"
requirement of rule 34.11 The Court was concerned that the grand
jury might suffer "as a public institution serving the community"
if witnesses knew that their testimony would be revealed."
18. Id. at 206. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
19. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides that upon a showing of good cause, a
party to an action may request the court to order production and inspec-
tion of documents relevant to the case.
21. 356 U.S. at 681-82.
22. Id. at 683. "This 'indispensible secrecy of grand jury proceedings'
must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity. There are
instances when that need will outweigh the countervailing policy. But they
must be shown with particularity." Id. at 682 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 682. Later civil cases are in accord. In Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963), the court permitted disclo-
sure to a plaintiff in an action for damages for violation of antitrust laws,
holding that ."disclosure of grand jury testimony is properly granted where
there is a compelling need for such disclosure and such disclosure is re-
quired by the ends of justice." Id. at 242. Special need was also the grounds
for release of grand jury testimony in Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B.
Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963), where grand jury minutes were
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The Supreme Court, at its next term, held that the showing of this
"particularized need" was likewise required by rule 6(e), and that
when properly shown, the trial court may lift secrecy "discreetly and
limitedly." 4 Once again the Court was concerned that release of
grand jury testimony might prove detrimental to grand jury effec-
tiveness.
To make public any part of its [the grand jury's] proceedings would inevita-
bly detract from its efficacy. Grand jurors would not act with that independ-
ence required of an accusatory and inquisitorial body. Moreover, not only
would the participation of the jurors be curtailed, but testimony would be
parsimonious if each witness knew that his testimony would soon be in the
hands of the accused.2
Prior to the Biaggi decision no disclosure of grand jury testimony
had been made by a court except in connection with a judicial
proceeding, as required by rule 6(e). However, the term "judicial
proceeding" has been somewhat liberally construed. In Doe v.
Rosenberry"6 grand jury minutes were requested by the Grievance
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
for use in determining whether charges should be brought against a
member of the Bar. Faced with the limitations imposed by rule 6(e),
Judge Learned Hand defined "judicial proceeding" as:
Any proceeding determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance
of any person, subject to judicial control, with standards imposed upon his
conduct in the public interest, even though such compliance is enforced
without the procedure applicable to the punishment of crime."
Since the courts had invested the Grievance Committee with the
responsibility of recommending action against members of the Bar
to the appellate division, Judge Hand reasoned that an examination
by the Committee was "preliminary to a judicial proceeding", and
therefore, release of the grand jury minutes was proper under rule
requested for use during the deposition process in a civil antitrust case:
"We do not think it can be said that simply because disclosure is sought
in aid of a recovery rather than to defend against recovery or criminal
conviction, justice will never require disclosure to a civil plaintiff." Id. at
434.
24. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399
(1959); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
25. 360 U.S. at 400.
26. 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958).
27. Id. at 120.
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6(e).
The District Court for the District of Columbia was faced with a
similar problem in In re Bullock, 9 when the Board of Commission-
ers for the District requested grand jury minutes to determine
whether a police officer was guilty of dereliction of duty. Noting that
any authority to release these minutes rested on rule 6(e),30 the court
relied on the language of Metzler3 to support its finding that "[B]y
way of interpretation the Federal Courts have extended their juris-
diction so that they may remove the seal of privacy from Grand Jury
proceedings when in the Court's discretion the furtherance of justice
requires it."3 By deciding that it must balance the public's interest
in disclosure against the need for secrecy,33 the court evinced a par-
ticular concern for the public interest in determining whether a
public officer's conduct was improper. The court held that when
public interest is clear, grand jury secrecy will be suspended in favor
of disclosure. 4 As a result the testimony was released to the Board
for use in its investigation to determine whether charges were to be
brought. Using the rationale of the court in Doe, the Bullok case
may be brought within the ambit of rule 6(e).
The protection of witnesses has been advanced as an important
reason for continued grand jury secrecy. If the grand jury is to func-
tion effectively, those who come before it must be assured that what
is said during the proceedings may be said in confidence." The state
has an important interest in preserving the secrecy of the testimony,
28. Id.
29. 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952).
30. Id. at 641.
31. 64 F.2d at 206.
32. In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. at 641. See also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962) (disclosure denied to FTC investi-
gators); In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence Before October, 1959
Grand Jury, 184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960) (limited use granted to State's
attorney in preparation of case).
33. 103 F. Supp. at 642.
34. Id. at 643. See also Note, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 175 (1971).
35. United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 246 (N.D.
Ohio 1940). In this case the court said: "It is a hearty respect for that
public policy which invites, permits, and protects absolute freedom and
security of expression before the grand jury. What is said to that agency
of the court is said in confidence." Id. See also In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284-85 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
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as an inducement for obtaining evidence.36
Some have suggested that these arguments lose force once the
grand jury has been discharged and the accused apprehended, or
after the grand jury has been disbanded without handing down an
indictment.3 1 In giving testimony to the grand jury the witness must
recognize that he will be expected to repeat the testimony at trial.
Fear of reprisal should therefore not be a bar to disclosure. The rule
of secrecy was established primarily for the protection of the grand
jurors themselves and the preservation of the grand jury as an effec-
tive body, and not for the protection of witnesses.
There is, however, ample support for the proposition that protec-
tion of witnesses is a well recognized and respected interest of the
courts."' Thus, testimony has been disclosed where the courts, in
36. Calkins supra note 7, at 459; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2362 at 736
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961): "The witnesses and the complainants ap-
pearing before the grand jury must be guaranteed temporarily against
compulsory disclosure of their testimony and complaints because other-
wise the state could not expect to secure ample quantity of evidence for
the information of the grand jury. The secrecy is the state's inducement
for obtaining testimony. The policy is analogous to that of the privilege for
informers in general. The privilege, therefore, is not the grand juror's, for
he is merely an indifferent mouthpiece of the disclosure. Nor is it entirely
the state's, for the state's interest is merely the motive for constituting the
privilege. The theory of the privilege is that the witness is guaranteed
against compulsory disclosure; the privilege must therefore be that of the
witness, and rests upon his consent." Id. (citations omitted).
37. Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1933); Atwell
v. United States, 162 F. 97, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1908); Calkins supra note 7,
at 460; Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a
New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 307
(1969).
38. United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, 137 F. Supp. 197, 201
(D.N.J. 1955). Mr. Justice Brennan condemned the strict protection of
witness' testimony in his dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.: "Witnesses
before a grand jury necessarily know that once called by the Government
to testify at trial they cannot remain secret informants quite apart from
whether their grand jury testimony is discoverable." 360 U.S. at 406-07.
39. 360 U.S. at 406 (Brennan, J. dissenting); Calkins, supra note 7, at
461.
40. 360 U.S. at 400; United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677, 682 (1958); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284-85 (E.D.
Pa. 1933).
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their discretion, have found the "need" to outweigh the policy of
secrecy." The cases frequently deal with a witness accused of per-
jury before the grand jury. In United States v. Rose42 the defendant
appealed such a conviction, alleging that the court's refusal to let
him inspect his grand jury testimony was error. Before trial the
defendant requested the right to inspect that portion of the grand
jury transcript containing his testimony. He contended that due to
41. "A defendant in a criminal prosecution is not entitled to disclosure
of grand jury proceedings as a matter of right, but, in order to obtain
disclosure, must show a 'particularized need' therefore that outweighs the
policy of secrecy. In other words, before a defendant may have inspection
of the grand jury minutes he must make a showing of facts that there is
good cause for inspection. The burden of showing good cause or 'particular-
ized need' is on the defendant, and the showing must be made with parti-
cularlity." 1 L. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 502-03 (footnotes omitted). In
United States Indus. Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th
Cir. 1965), the court of appeals analyzed the need versus secrecy test in
the following manner: "[A] violation of the traditional grand jury secrecy
should only be permitted upon a showing of 'particularized and compelling
need.' But we cannot treat this test in vacuo. We must take recognition
first of the fact that whether such a 'need' exists is a matter designedly
left initially to the discretion of the trial judge. In the absence of an abso-
lute prohibition against disclosure, an exercise of judicial discretion is
manifestly required. Secondly, it must be kept in mind that, in making a
determination of when to permit a disclosure of grand jury proceedings, we
are to examine, not only the need of the party seeking disclosure, but also
the policy considerations for grand jury secrecy as they apply to the request
for disclosure thereunder consideration. In other words, if the reasons for
maintaining secrecy do not apply at all in a given situation, or apply to
only an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclosure should not be
required to demonstrate a large compelling need." Id. at 21. The court
found support for its position in Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., "Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end
in itself. Grand jury secrecy is maintained to serve particular ends. But
when secrecy will not serve those ends or when the advantages gained by
secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing interest in disclosure, secrecy
may and should be lifted, for to do so in such a circumstance would further
the fair administration of criminal justice." 345 F.2d at 22 (quoting 360
U.S. at 403). But see United States v. Skurla, 126 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa.
1954); United States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 61 F. Supp.
590 (D.N.J. 1945) which would permit disclosure only in cases of "extreme
compulsion."
42. 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954). See also United States v. Remington,
191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
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physical illness at the time he was unable to recall the testimony in
detail, and that examination of his full testimony would give it a
meaning different from that charged in the indictment. The motion
was denied, and the defendant was convicted. Reversing the convic-
tion, the third circuit strongly condemned the policy of secrecy in
these circumstances as unreasonable and contrary to a sense of jus-
tice:
Since all the defendant desires is a transcript of his own testimony, the
sanctity of that which transpired before the Grand Jury is hardly in question.
In addition, such disclosure would not subvert any of the reasons tradition-
ally given for the inviolability of Grand Jury proceedings.,3
In United States v. Badger Paper Mills, Inc.,4 the defendants in
a civil antitrust suit requested disclosure of the grand jury testi-
mony of six potential trial witnesses. The witnesses themselves also
requested disclosure in order to refresh their recollection for the
trial. The court considered the traditional arguments for secrecy,
but concluded that where the witnesses themselves sought disclo-
sure, it was proper for the court to grant limited access to the grand
jury record:
[T]he witnesses themselves have consented to and requested disclosure of
their testimony and do not desire the protection which the plaintiff seeks to
invoke on their behalf. And we fail to see how the order sought by the defen-
dants can give future grand jury witnesses cause for concern since the defen-
dants have asked for disclosure only of the testimony of witnesses who have
consented and since disclosure is requested only to (1) the witnesses them-
selves, (2) counsel for the witnesses, and, (3) counsel for the defendants.,
In the past, when grand jury testimony has been released, it has
always been carefully limited in scope." The fear that release of
testimony would lead to reprisals against grand jurors and an intim-
idation of witnesses has had its effect on the courts. 7 Recent deci-
43. 215 F.2d at 630 (emphasis omitted).
44. 243 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
45. Id. at 446.
46. In re Grand Jury Transcripts, 309 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D. Ohio
1970); In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence Before October, 1959 Grand
Jury, 184 F. Supp. 38, 41 (E.D. Va. 1960).
47. This concern is exemplified by the stern language of an opinion by
Judge Learned Hand, in which he denied a motion to inspect grand jury
minutes made by defendants in a criminal case: "[The granting of inspec-
tion of grand jury minutes] is said to lie in discretion, and perhaps it does,
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sions, however, have used the discretion recognized in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United States" to overcome this obstacle to dis-
closure. When certain parts of the testimony to be released contain
material that would endanger the grand jurors or witnesses, the
court may order that the minutes be edited.49
In In re Biaggi, appellant originally sought a limited review of the
grand jury transcipt by a panel of three judges. The court was to
consider these minutes and respond to a question framed by the
appellant, without disclosure of the testimony itself.5 0 In the district
court the petitioner argued that he was wronged by the improper
leak of information to the media concerning his appearance before
the grand jury.5' He sought, therefore, a form of relief that would
preserve secrecy and yet counter the allegations he had publicly
denied.5" Petitioner argued as follows:
One need only point out that it is a failure on the part of the Office of the
but no judge of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will ...
No doubt grand juries err and indictments are calamities to honest men,
but we must work with human beings and we can correct such errors only
at too large a price. Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the
accused. Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of the in-
nocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays,
and defeats the prosecution of crime." United States v. Garsson, 291 F.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
48. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
49. Accordingly, in United States Indus. Inc. v. United States District
Court, 345 F.2d 18, 22 (9th Cir. 1965), the court of appeals was petitioned
to reseal a government document containing grand jury testimony which
was to be used at trial. The court expressed its concern with the effect of
disclosure on future witnesses before grand juries, but held that disclosure
could be had with proper editing. "We are convinced that if, on examina-
tion of the memorandum, the district judge determined that the references
to the grand jury proceedings were so particularized that future grand jury
witnesses might become inhibited . . . the district judge could, with little
effort, delete the references to witness names or take any other action
which best will maintain the document's substance while protecting the
anonymity of the witnesses." See also In re Grand Jury of January, 1969,
315 F. Supp. 662, 678-79 (D. Md. 1970), infra note 70; United States v.
Badger Paper Mills Inc., 243 F. Supp. 443, 446 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
50. The text of the question presented by the Congressman is set out
at note 2, supra.
51. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 5.
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United States Attorney adequately to safeguard the integrity of the Grand
Jury proceedings that has placed Petitioner in a position in which he has
literally been obligated into bringing the instant application. Petitioner truly
never should have been faced with this problem; but being faced with the
problem, he has devised a most appropriate method for resolving it with the
least amount of intrusion upon the traditional secrecy of the Grand Jury and
with the least amount of danger that there will be any private prejudice to
the persons who appeared before or were mentioned in connection with this
Grand Jury proceeding."
The petitioner admitted the lack of precedent for his request for
limited review of the minutes. 4 The procedure that most nearly
resembles Congressman Biaggi's request is the practice of having
the trial judge review the grand jury minutes in camera to determine
whether there are inconsistencies between a witness' grand jury and
trial testimony."5 If discrepancies are found the court may release
the appropriate portion of the testimony to the defendant. If no
inconsistencies are found the court will reseal the minutes and deny
the request for inspection." However, this has been done only in
cases dealing with the possible impeachment of witnesses at a sub-
sequent judicial proceeding.
Before arguments on the original petition were heard, the United
States Attorney moved for a release of the grand jury minutes to the
general public, redacted to protect other parties. The government
argued that the petitioner made his request with the expectation
that it would be denied, and that this was clearly an attempt to use
the secrecy of the testimony to manipulate the court into presenting
Congressman Biaggi's testimony in a false light. The district court
agreed that the Congressman's motion for limited review was made
52. N.Y. Times, April 18, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
53. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 5.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1041 (1968); United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir.
1967); United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959).
56. United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338, 339 (2d Cir. 1958);
Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA.
L. REV. 668, 675 (1962); Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 712 (1968). In the Spangelet
decision, the court denied that Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)
(which held that the government has a duty to bring forth all evidence in
its possession that would tend to exculpate the accused) authorized the
release of grand jury testimony to defendant's counsel as a matter of right.
It upheld the previous procedure of in camera review.
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with the expectation that it would be denied, thereby precluding
direct inquiry into his actual testimony.
Upon reflection, this court can only conclude that this blatantly unsanc-
tioned petition was made with an expectation of its denial by the court, and
for the purpose of publicly exploiting the court's denial of the motion. A
forseeable purpose of this exploitation is plain to discern, that of attributing
to undisclosed grand jury testimony a content or a meaning either inconsist-
ent with or arguably different from that testimony."7
Judge Palmieri found that the petition constituted an abuse of the
court's processes, and granted the government's motion in the "pub-
lic interest."
The rule of secrecy, important and essential as it is to the traditional func-
tions of the grand jury, cannot be permitted to be maneuvered in order to
reach a result which may not be consonant with factual premises.
A rigid application of the rule of secrecy under the unusual circumstances of
this case would permit this salutary rule to be subverted for a use for which
it was never intended.-"
The district court also disclaimed any responsibility, for itself or
the United States Attorney, for the leak of the grand jury proceed-
ings to the media, noting that the number, size, and composition of
modern grand juries make the security of their proceedings practi-
cally impossible. The court arguably implied that secrecy could no
longer be guaranteed and enforced by the courts. "9 The district court
57. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at 1, 34, col. 3.
58. Id. at col. 4.
59. Id. A by-product of this case was an investigation by the United
States Attorney's office into the leak of information concerning Congress-
man Biaggi's testimony before the grand jury, as ordered by the court of
appeals, 478 F.2d at 490 n.1. It was found that two employees of federal
agencies that were not directly involved in the grand jury investigation
were responsible for the leaks. As a result of this investigation, the United
States Attorney recommended that rule 6(e) be amended to include the
following provision: "No employee of any government law enforcement
office or agency shall disclose to any unauthorized person information
concerning matters occurring before the Grand Jury, no matter how the
same shall come to his attention. Any violation of the secrecy provisions
of this rule shall be punished as a contempt, notwithstanding the fact that
the term of the Grand Jury before which the proceedings occurred may
have expired." 170 N.Y.L.J. 1 (July 11, 1973). For a view of the responsibil-
ities of the press in this controversial matter, see Reston, The Press and
the Courts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § 4, at 17, col. 1.
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denied Congressman Biaggi's petition and granted that of the
United States Attorney, ordering release of the edited minutes to
the public.
While the court may have been justified in denying Congressman
Biaggi's petition for limited review,'" there is apparently no basis in
the law for granting the government's motion to make public grand
jury testimony. While rule 6(e) permits the government wide use of
the secret grand jury testimony, no government motion for the re-
lease of such testimony has been granted absent a prior request by
a defendant or witness in another judicial proceeding,"' or by an
investigative body for use in connection with a possible judicial
process. " Case law strongly indicates that the government must
limit its use of grand jury minutes to the preparation and develop-
ment of its cases. 3 The cases also indicate that the government
cannot take it upon itself to expose alleged "abuse of the court's
processes" by moving for the release of the grand jury record to, in
effect, "hoist Congressman Biaggi on his own petard." 4
Whenever the courts have ordered the disclosure of grand jury
proceedings it has been done "discreetly and limitedly." 5 Release
is usually made to a limited number of people directly concerned
with the subject matter of the minutes released. In In re Petition
for Disclosure of Evidence Before October, 1959 Grand Jury,6 the
grand jury transcripts were to be examined within the courthouse
under the strict supervision of the clerk of the court. 7 In Doe the
grand jury minutes remained in the possession of the Grievance
Committee. In re Grand Jury of January, 19699 indicates that
portions of the grand jury proceedings traditionally kept secret
60. 478 F.2d at 493.
61. Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958).
62. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962).
63. See note 12 supra.
64. Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 3, In
re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973).
65. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399
(1959), quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683
(1958).
66. 184 F. Supp. 38 E.D. Va. 1960).
67. Id. at 41.
68. 255 F.2d at 120.
69. 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970).
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should not be released to the public, since the potential harm to
those not mentioned in the indictment outweighs the "need" for
disclosure.'" Congressman Biaggi had been accused of no crime in
any indictment handed down by any grand jury. He would seem
entitled, as a witness, to the defense of his expectation of strict
confidentiality.
The court of appeals agreed that no precedent could be found for
releasing the appellant's grand jury testimony under rule 6(e). It
viewed the case as falling beyond the intent of the rule, holding that
"the permission to disclose for use in connection with 'a judicial
proceeding' does not encompass a proceeding instituted solely for
the purpose of accomplishing disclosure."'" Rule 6(e) was intended
to govern the use of grand jury testimony in relation to subsequent
judicial proceedings. Congressman Biaggi presented a new question:
whether a witness could procure his own testimony when not in-
volved in a judicial proceeding. The proposition that the United
States Attorney could unilaterally move for the release of the testi-
mony to the general public was rejected by the court:
The permitted disclosure 'to the attorneys for the government for use in
70. In this case the media had reported that several public officers were
being investigated by the grand jury. The court was then asked "for an
order suppressing from public disclosure and expunging from the records"
the presentment of the grand jury which the United States Attorney had
refused to sign, thus blocking the indictments. Id. at 666. The court consid-
ered the various policy reasons for disclosure of the material, and held that
the circumstances of the case permitted some kind of release: "The Court
is the agency which must weigh in each case the various interests involved,
including the right of the public to know and the rights of the persons
mentioned in the presentment, whether they are charged or not. The Court
should regulate the amount of disclosure, to be sure that it is no greater
than is required by the public 'interest in knowing' when weighed against
the rights of the persons mentioned in the presentment. It is not necessary
. . . to lay down a rule which should apply in all situations. Each case
should be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Here, there has been
much discussion and disclosure in the communications media, some true,
and some not true . . . . Under these circumstances, the Court concludes
that the substance of the charges in the indictment should be disclosed,
omitting certain portions as to which the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, concludes that the public interest in disclosure is outweighed
by the private prejudice to the persons involved, none of whom are charged
with any crime in the proposed indictment." Id. at 678-79.
71. 478 F.2d at 492.
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performance of their duties' refers to their need for the minutes in the prepa-
ration of criminal or, sometimes, civil cases; it does not confer a license to
broadcast a transcript of grand jury proceedings to the world .... 11
The government's claim of "particularized need;" and the public
interest in knowing whether a candidate for elective office had lied
to the public about his grand jury testimony, was also insufficient
to persuade the court to order release of Congressman Biaggi's testi-
mony. Something more was needed:
(Ilf Mr. Biaggi had made no application to the district court, the Govern-
ment could not have procured disclosure of his grand jury testimony. No
matter how much, or how legitimately, the public may want to know whether
a candidate for high public office has invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination before a grand jury, or has lied about having done so, that
interest must generally yield to the larger one of preserving the salutary rule
of law embodied in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
The court declined to decide whether the original motion for lim-
ited review was sufficient for disclosure of the grand jury testimony
to be ordered.74 The court found, however, that Congressman
Biaggi's later motion for complete disclosure of all of the grand jury
testimony was a waiver by him of the protection afforded by the rule
of secrecy.7" The court interpreted his motion as a request for com-
plete disclosure of the testimony "for its own sake and not merely
as the lesser of evils should release of the redacted minutes beoup-
held." Any protection afforded a witness before the grand jury was
72. Id.
73. Id. at 492-93.
74. Id. at 493.
75. Id. Waiver has been applied to grand jury proceedings in questions
of self-incrimination and immunity. The privilege against self-
incrimination can be waived by a witness when such an intention is clearly
conveyed. See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949). The privi-
lege is for the benefit of the witness and is personal. See Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951). In re Grand Jury Transcripts, 309 F.
Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
76. 478 F.2d at 493. The motion in question reads in part: "I
[Congressman Biaggi] submit to the Court that any disclosure short of
full disclosure of my testimony during both of my appearances before the
Grand Jury would do me the gravest possible injustice. It appears to me
indisputable that . . . . disclosure of any of my testimony with deletion
of names of individuals other than mine would open the door to unlimited
speculation by the public and press as to the names of those individuals,
and there is no way I could fill in those names with impunity. Indeed, if
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thereby waived by the appellant and the United States Attorney.
These waivers permitted disclosure to be ordered." The interests of
the grand jurors and other persons mentioned in the minutes were
protected by editing out all other names from the minutes to be
released: "[O]nce Mr. Biaggi's motion gave the district judge
power to direct the disclosure that had been sought, it was for the
judge to determine what reasonable conditions should be im-
posed.""7 The fact that the order for disclosure was based on the
government's motion, the propriety of which the court rejected,
rather than Congressman Biaggi's subsequent motion, was dis-
counted as immaterial.79
After the grand jury minutes were released the court issued a
supplementary opinion,80 indicating that contrary to public state-
ments by the Congressman, he had failed to answer seventeen ques-
tions put to him by the grand jury."' However, these did not deal
directly with his personal finances as alleged by the media. Chief
Judge Friendly proceeded to qualify his previous decision:
Our decision should . . .not be taken as demanding, or even authorizing,
public disclosure of a witness' grand jury testimony in every case where he
seeks this and the Government consents. It rests on the exercise of a sound
discretion under the special circumstances of this case."2
there is to be any disclosure, as the Court has ordered, such disclosure must
be full, complete and accurate; or I shall be forever deprived, to my very
great harm and prejudice, of any realistic possibility of adequate explana-
tion. WHEREFORE, I respectfully request that the Court grant an Order
. . .directing complete release of the transcripts of my Grand Jury testi-
mony. . . each and every page, with no deletions." In re Biaggi, Index No.
Mll-188 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1973). Though it is clear throughout that the
appellant has been opposed to full release of the grand jury minutes as well
as any partial release, the final paragraph, framing the order requested,
indicates that this is a new request for full disclosure, and not a motion
for full release in the alternative.
77. 478 F.2d at 493.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 494.
81. Id. The text of Congressman Biaggi's grand jury testimony can be
found in the N.Y. Times, May 13, 1973, § 1, at 57, col. 3.
82. 478 F.2d at 494. Judge Hays, in a brief dissenting opinion, opposed
the exercise of the court's discretionary powers to release the grand jury
minutes. He urged a strict adherence to the guidelines embodied in rule
19731
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Chief Judge Friendly then reaffirmed the position that disclosure
of grand jury testimony can be made only at the discretion of the
court upon an examination of the circumstances of each case. In the
supplementary opinion the court made it clear that, because of
public statements made by Congressman Biaggi which cast his
grand jury testimony in a false light, the court saw fit to grant his
motion for public disclosure, although in a form different than that
requested by him. 3 Though the court of appeals indicated that the
district court erred in granting the motion of the United States
Attorney, 4 it did not decide whether the district court could have
ordered disclosure based on the original motion for limited review.85
Thus, the higher court was able to use the motion for full disclosure
made by Congressman Biaggi as the means for ordering release,
albeit with names deleted, even though such an action by the court
would harm him.
The second circuit found the public interest in knowing the full
contents of the grand jury minutes insufficient. The language of the
supplementary opinion evinces a desire to prevent Congressman
Biaggi from using grand jury secrecy in an improper way, 6 that is,
attempting to deceive the public by depending on the court to deny
his initial motion for limited review, thereby avoiding a direct and
complete inquiry into his actual testimony. In expanding the scope
of permissible disclosure to requests not made in connection with a
judicial proceeding the court of appeals failed to face the serious
question underlying the case: in the absence of a waiver by a wit-
ness, what power does the court have to deal with attempts to mis-
use the secrecy of the grand jury in the future?
6(e). "[T]he rules of law are a more reliable guide to the administration
of justice than the personal views of judges as to what 'the public interest'
may require." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 492.
85. Id. at 493.
86. Id. at 494.
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